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Abstract:  
We show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the 
optimal volatility of the exchange rate, above and beyond the size of trade flows. Using 
an analytically tractable small open economy model, we characterize the impact of the 
trade composition on the policy trade-off and on the role played by the exchange rate in 
correcting for price misalignments. Contrary to models where openness can be 
summarized by the degree of home bias, we find that openness can be a poor proxy of 
the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Using input-output data for 25 
countries we document substantial differences in the import and non-tradable content of 
final demand components, and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic 
production. The estimates are used in a richer small-open-economy DSGE model to 
quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the Ramsey policy conditional on 
the composition of imports. We find that the main determinant of the losses is the share 
of non-traded goods in final demand. 
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11. Introduction2
The nominal exchange rate is probably the defining variable in open-economy monetary3
economics. In an economy where trade barriers result in little international exchange of4
assets and goods, the monetary policymaker can neglect the effects on the nominal exchange5
rate of its policy at a limited cost in terms of welfare. On the contrary, in a very open6
economy, exchange rate adjustments are likely to be a key ingredient in the design of the7
optimal monetary policy response to shocks.8
In this paper we argue that the composition of international trade flows can affect the9
policy trade-off faced by the policymaker and the optimal response of the exchange rate10
to shocks, above and beyond the degree of openness, measured by the size of the inter-11
national trade flows.1 Our modeling approach allows economies with identical degree of12
openness to differ in the degree of home bias in the demand for tradable goods, in the share13
of non-tradables in consumption and investment demand, and in the share of imported inter-14
mediates in domestic production.2 We find that there is no systematic relationship between15
openness and optimal exchange rate volatility, and discuss how the composition of trade16
flows impacts the policy trade-off, and the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for17
price misalignments.18
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we document from input-output tables data19
that differences in the composition of international trade flows across both industrial and20
emerging economies are substantial, and provide estimates of the tradable and non-tradable21
input shares in consumption and investment for 25 countries.22
1The openness of an economy to trade in goods and services is determined by trade policy and the
existence of trade barriers, regardless of the actual amount of trade flows occurring in equilibrium. Our
measure of openness correlates optimal policy choices with observable trade flows. In our model, openness
is determined by preference and technology parameters, which are taken as primitives by the policymaker,
and determine steady state trade flows.
2A similar emphasis on non-traded goods is also in Corsetti et al. (2008), Dotsey and Duarte (2008) and
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008). Devereux and Engel (2007) consider imported intermediate goods in production.
Engel and Wang (2010) discuss the importance of durable consumption in explaining the high volatility of
imports and exports.
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Second, we build a simple, analytically tractable, multi-good model of a small open econ-23
omy (SOE) with one-period preset prices to illustrate through which channels the composi-24
tion of imports affects the policy trade-off and the transmission of shocks under alternative25
policy regimes.26
In our model both imported and exported goods are priced in foreign markets, similarly27
to Mendoza (1995). This set up implies that the terms of trade are independent of policy.28
Because of the preferences specification, this exogeneity is not important for our analyti-29
cal results on optimal policy, while it allows us to easily characterize the consequences of30
exchange rate misalignments in an economy with multiple imported goods. Additionally,31
our assumption about pricing is appropriate to describe emerging market economies, which32
typically specialize in the export of few primary commodities, and are normally small play-33
ers in the world markets. For these countries, terms of trade variations can be considered34
exogenous.35
Finally, we discuss how our results carry over to a more complete model of the economy,36
including sector-specific capital, imported investment goods, and incomplete financial mar-37
kets. In this setup, we assess quantitatively the welfare implications of the composition of38
international trade flows using parameter values estimated from input-output tables.39
Our analytical results show that the rate at which the optimal policy trades off inefficiency40
gaps across sectors depends on the relative weight of each good in the household preferences,41
but is not directly related to openness, which depends also on the share of imported interme-42
diate inputs in production. Even in the limiting case where the composition of imports does43
not affect the trade-off, it still affects the welfare cost of a peg through two channels. First,44
the share of imported intermediates in production affects the optimal volatility of exchange45
rate movements, for given trade-off. Second, the weight of the inefficiently-priced good in46
the CPI affects the size of the welfare loss under a peg, for given optimal volatility of the47
exchange rate.48
In our model, a peg is costly because it forces the adjustment in the tradable/non-tradable49
relative price on the sticky nominal price. This mechanism works through the spill-over of50
input prices across sectors: since labor is mobile across sectors, any change affecting the51
conditions for efficient production in one sector will spill over to the other sector through52
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changes in nominal wages, resulting in a price misalignment under a peg. This propagation53
mechanism explains the role of the intermediate imports share: a larger share requires a54
larger optimal movement in the exchange rate to prevent changes in nominal wages across55
all sectors and inefficient mark-up fluctuations. The intermediate imports share is only56
relevant if production is asymmetric across sectors. If tradable and non-tradable goods are57
produced with the same technology, the optimal policy calls for exchange rate stability in58
response to shocks to imported intermediate prices.59
The numerical results confirm that our findings extend to a richer sticky price SOE model.60
Openness and optimal exchange rate volatility turn out to be close to orthogonal variables.61
This result holds also if financial markets are incomplete and regardless of the importance of62
distortions in the pricing of imports or of frictions preventing costless labor mobility across63
sectors. An exchange rate peg leads to large welfare losses in an economy where the share of64
imported intermediates in the domestic production input mix is high, and at the same time65
the bias towards non-tradable goods is high. In an equally open economy importing mainly66
consumption or investment goods a peg leads only to a modest welfare loss. When estimating67
the model’s preference and technology parameters using OECD input-output tables data for68
25 countries, we find that the welfare loss is highly correlated with the share of non-tradable69
goods in final demand.370
Our paper is related to several recent contributions. Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961)71
pointed out long ago that, in economies displaying nominal rigidities, nominal exchange rate72
adjustments are a key ingredient in the efficient response to shocks. A more recent literature73
recognizes that the optimal volatility of the exchange rate crucially depends on the degree74
of openness of the economy, which in the simplest models, where all goods are tradable, is75
inversely related to the degree of home bias in preferences.4 Our analysis shows that results76
3In this exercise, our welfare metric is the cost of fixing the exchange rate, relative to the optimal policy.
This is a welfare measure that is relevant from the point of view of the policymaker. IMF (2008) reports
that 84 countries have either a fixed exchange rate target or rely on a currency board.
4Corsetti et al. (2012) highlight the welfare costs and trade-offs brought about by a (real) exchange rate
misalignment in open-economy models with nominal rigidities. Corsetti (2006), Sutherland (2005) and Faia
and Monacelli (2008) study explicitly the relationship between openness and optimal policy. These authors
don’t consider richer compositions of international trade and of domestic demand. While focusing on different
aspects of optimal policy, also Corsetti et al. (2008), De Paoli (2009a) and Engel (2011) acknowledge the
importance of home bias in their results.
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from stylized models where home bias and openness are directly related cannot be generalized77
once the cross-country variation in the composition of imports is taken into account.78
Faia and Monacelli (2008) provide a detailed analysis of the impact of home bias on79
optimal policy in a small open economy model with only tradable goods. They conclude80
that optimal exchange rate volatility is monotonically decreasing in the degree of openness.81
Corsetti (2006) shows in a two-country model that exchange rate volatility is optimal when-82
ever there is home bias, even if import prices are preset in local currency, following a local83
currency pricing framework also used by Devereux and Engel (2003). In the presence of home84
bias, exchange rate fluctuations allow the policymaker to optimally respond to asymmetric85
shocks. The relationship between openness - proportional to the degree of home bias - and86
optimal exchange rate volatility is non-monotonic, although volatility increases for positive87
degrees of home bias. The existence of several additional goods and the spill-over across88
sectors of sectoral shocks implies that neither of these results hold in our model.89
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) present a two-country model where the existence of non-90
traded goods, rather than home bias, generates asymmetry in the way domestic and foreign91
consumption react to shocks, and result in exchange rate volatility under the optimal policy92
even in the absence of exchange rate pass-through. As in their work, the existence of non-93
traded goods in our model implies that the risk-sharing condition depends on the relative94
price of traded and non-traded goods, generating an incentive for the optimal policymaker to95
manipulate allocations through the exchange rate. Dotsey and Duarte (2008) examine the96
role of non-tradables for business cycle correlations in a model similar to ours. They assume97
a complete input-output structure in the economy, so that final non-tradable goods are an98
input in domestic production. We have only a partial input-output structure in the model,99
but parameterize the final demand aggregators using estimates of input shares, rather than100
final demand shares, so as to account for the shares of final goods production being used as101
intermediates by other sectors. In this way, our model is more easily comparable with most102
of the recent open economy macroeconomics literature.103
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides empirical results on the role104
of imported consumption and intermediate goods, and estimates of the tradable and non-105
tradable goods’ shares in final demand for 25 countries. Section 3 develops a one-period106
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preset-price model and derives analytical results concerning the relationship between the107
composition of international trade flows and optimal monetary policy. Section 4 describes108
the model used to obtain our numerical results on welfare outcomes. Section 5 concludes.109
2. Trade Flows Composition and Tradable Goods Demand across Countries110
We document a number of empirical results on the composition of final demand, on the111
magnitude of imported consumption and investment relative to the size of the domestic112
economy, and on the role played by imported inputs in domestic production for 25 industrial113
and emerging economies using input-output tables by the OECD.5 The final demand share114
of each component of imports depends on the import share in the tradable basket, and115
on the share of tradable and non-tradable goods in final demand. Since these shares are116
separately parameterized in open economy DSGE models with a non-tradable sector, we117
use the input-output tables to compute estimates of the share of tradable and non-tradable118
goods in consumption and investment demand.119
We estimate the tradable share of demand using an approach similar to that of De120
Gregorio et al. (1994). For each industry in the input-output tables, we define a tradability121
measure equal to the sum of exports and imports relative to its gross output. The output122
from an industry is considered tradable if its tradability measure is above a critical threshold.123
We consider a 10% threshold, identical across countries.6124
We measure the content of tradable and non-tradable goods in final demand using sym-125
metric input-output tables at basic prices, where the final dollar demand for a good is126
reported net of the cost paid to cover local (non-tradable) services. Thus the data allocate127
the value of the distribution margin for imported goods to the appropriate (non-tradable)128
industry. Additionally, to account for the intermediate non-tradable (tradable) input content129
5Our dataset consists of the 2009 edition of the OECD input-output tables. For most of the countries
we averaged the results obtained from the two available tables between 2000 and 2005. For Korea, Mexico,
New-Zealand and Slovakia only one year was available.
6Lombardo and Ravenna (2012) provide a detailed analysis of tradability estimates using input-output
data, and report results using a country specific threshold, equal to the tradability measure of the wholesale
and retail trade sector (which is assumed to produce non-tradable output) in each country. A 10% threshold
is used by De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Betts and Kehoe (2001) and is close to the average tradability
measure based on wholesale and retail sector used by Bems (2008).
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in the final demand of tradable (non-tradable) goods, we compute tradable input shares -130
rather than final demand shares - defined as the share of tradable goods embedded in a dol-131
lar of final demand throughout the whole production chain. Lombardo and Ravenna (2012)132
provide details on the computation using input-output tables data.133
Table 1 compares the consumption and investment non-tradable input shares across our134
sample of countries. US and Japan are at the high end of the range, while small open135
economies, such as Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg, have consumption non-tradables input136
shares of around 20%.137
Table 1 also summarizes data on openness, imports and demand composition. The data138
show that there is a remarkable variation both in the export to GDP ratio, a standard139
measure of trade openness, and in the composition of imports. Not only demand for imports140
can come from different components of final demand - such as consumption or investment141
- but countries differ also in the amount of final relative to intermediate goods imported,142
and in the relative importance of imported intermediates in domestic production. Italy and143
Portugal, for example, have nearly identical degree of openness, while the share of imported144
consumption goods in total consumption is nearly twice as large in Portugal (17%) than in145
Italy (9%), and the ratio of intermediate imports to GDP is equal to 24% in Portugal and146
18% in Italy. Five countries rely on imported inputs for a value larger than 40% of GDP.147
Estonia and Slovakia are the largest importers of intermediates relative to the size of the148
economy, with a ratio of imported inputs to GDP just below 59%, while the US is at the149
low end of the range, with a ratio of 7.6%.150
Finally, the data reported in Table 1 document a large cross-country variation in the151
share of tradable investment demand which is not domestically produced. For example,152
using the data in Table 1 the share of imported investment in total tradable investment153
results equal to about 22% in Germany and 43% in the Czech Republic. The main factor154
driving these cross country differences is the share in GDP of imported investment, with a155
standard deviation of 42%, while the standard deviation for the tradable investment share156
and the share of investment demand in GDP is respectively equal to 17% and 18%.157
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3. A Simple Small Open Economy Model with Predetermined Prices158
In this section we develop a small open economy version of the model in Corsetti and159
Pesenti (2001) introducing non-tradable and multiple imported goods. We use the model to160
derive analytical results on the role of the composition of international trade in determining161
the optimal volatility of the exchange rate and the cost of an exchange rate misalignment.7162
The economy produces a non-tradable good (N) and a domestic tradable good (H) using163
labor and an imported intermediate input. Households’ preferences are defined over a basket164
of tradable (T ) and non-tradable goods. The tradable good basket includes two goods: a165
foreign good (F ), that must be imported, and the domestic tradable good. Prices in the166
N sector and for a fraction of the imported goods are preset one period in advance. All167
households’ consumption is assumed to be non-durable. In order to obtain analytical results168
we assume log preferences in consumption and Cobb-Douglas aggregators.169
We assume that both imported and exported goods are priced in foreign markets. This170
assumption implies that terms of trade are exogenous, so that the incentive to manipulate171
the terms of trade is absent in our model. Given our assumptions of log preferences in172
consumption and Cobb-Douglas aggregators, the terms of trade incentive would be absent173
even in the case of differentiated tradable goods (Corsetti et al., 2010b). Furthermore, as174
pointed out by Corsetti et al. (2010b), the literature is still divided about the relevance of175
this margin in determining optimal monetary policy decisions.176
3.1. Households177
Households choose labor hours Ht and consumption Ct to maximize expected utility178
Et
∞∑
i=0
β
[
log (Ct+i)−
H1+ηt+i
1 + η
]
(1)
subject to the period budget constraint179
PtCt + EtQt+1Bt+1 =W
H
t H
H
t +W
N
t H
N
t +Πt +Bt. (2)
7Our approach is related to a large literature in open economy macroeconomics, including Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel (2002), Devereux and Engel (2007), Faia and Monacelli (2008), Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Sutherland (2006) and Sutherland (2005).
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where Πt are profits rebated to the households by firms, Bt+1 is a portfolio of state-contingent180
securities ensuring complete financial markets, as in Chari et al. (2002), WHt and W
N
t are181
the wages paid in the non-tradable N and tradable H domestic production sector, and Ht =182
HNt +H
H
t . Total consumption Ct is a composite of non-tradable and tradable consumption183
baskets184
Ct = C
γn
N,tC
1−γn
T,t , (3)
where, in turn, the non-tradable consumption basket is made up of a continuum of differen-
tiated goods
CN,t =
[∫ 1
0
C
̺−1
̺
N,t (z)dz
] ̺
̺−1
with ̺ > 1. The tradable basket combines domestic and foreign produced goods,185
CT,t = C
γH
H,tC
1−γH
F,t (4)
with price indexes defined as186
Pt = γ
−γn
n (1− γn)
−(1−γn) P γnN,tP
1−γn
T,t (5)
PT,t = γ
−γH
H (1− γH)
−(1−γH ) P γHH,tP
1−γH
F,t (6)
The solution to the household problem implies the following first order conditions:187
CN,t =
γn
1− γn
(
PT,t
PN,t
)
CT,t ; CH,t =
γH
1− γH
(
PF,t
PH,t
)
CF,t
WNt
Pt
= Hηt Ct ;
WHt
Pt
= Hηt Ct
Ct
C∗t
= κ
StP
∗
t
Pt
where St is the nominal exchange rate, κ depends on initial relative consumption and where188
an asterisk indicates foreign variables. The labor supply optimality conditions imply that189
the nominal wage Wt is equalized across sectors.190
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3.2. Non-tradable Sector191
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by j produces output YN,t(j)using192
the technology193
YN,t (j) = ZN,tHN,t (j) (7)
where ZN,t is an exogenous productivity shock. The j good price at time t must be set one194
period in advance, and is denoted by pN,t−1(j). Demand for good j is given by195
YN,t (j) =
(
pN,t−1 (j)
PN,t
)−̺(
PN,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (8)
In period t firms choose pN,t(j) to maximize the expected household’s dividend196
Etβ
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
[
pN,t (j)−MC
nom
N,t+1
]
YN,t+1 (j) , (9)
conditional on the nominal marginal cost of production MCnomN,t+1 = Z
−1
N,t+1Wt+1.197
The first order condition implies:198
pN,t =
̺
̺− 1
Et
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
YN,t+1MC
nom
N,t+1
Et
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
YN,t+1
(10)
where we have dropped the firm index since all firms will choose the same optimal price,199
implying PN,t = pN,t−1.200
3.3. Domestic Tradable Sector201
Technology in this sector requires the use of imported intermediate goods Mt purchased202
at price StP
∗
M,t as input into production, where St denotes the nominal exchange rate:203
YH,t = ZH,tH
γv
H,tM
1−γv
t . (11)
Perfect competition implies that the price PH,t is set equal to the marginal cost of production.204
Since the H good is perfectly substitutable with goods produced abroad and sold at price205
10
StP
∗
H,t, the law of one price and production efficiency require206
StP
∗
H,t = Z
−1
H,t(1− γv)
−(1−γv) (γv)
(−γv)W
(γv)
t
(
StP
∗
M,t
)(1−γv)
. (12)
3.4. Foreign Sector207
The foreign-produced good F is purchased by a continuum of monopolistically compet-208
itive firms in the import sector as an input for production, at price StP
∗
F,t. A fraction γF209
presets the price pF,t in local currency one period in advance, while the remaining producers210
can reset the prices optimally in every period.211
Preferences for the goods supplied by the two types of importers are defined by a Cobb-212
Douglas aggregator, implying the domestic price of the final imported good is213
PF,t = γ
−γF
F (1− γF )
(γF−1) P γFs,F,t
(
̺
̺− 1
StP
∗
F,t
)(1−γF )
. (13)
where Ps,F,t is the price of the basket of goods supplied by the sticky-price importers,214
̺
̺− 1
StP
∗
F,t is the price charged by the (1 − γF ) fraction of importers, and without loss215
of generality we assume that the optimal mark-up
̺
̺− 1
in this sector is identical to the216
one in the non-tradable sector. This specification implies that if γF = 0 the imported final217
good prices are flexible, implying producer currency pricing (PCP), while if γF ∈ (0, 1] the218
pass-through of changes in StP
∗
F,t into changes in PF,t is incomplete in the short run. We219
will refer to this pricing arrangement as the Local Currency Pricing (LCP) case.220
Given the demand for sticky-price imported goods221
Ys,F,t(j) = γF
(
pF,t−1(j)
Ps,F,t
)−̺(
Ps,F,t
PF,t
)−1
CF,t (14)
the price chosen by the j sticky-price importer is222
pF,t =
̺
̺− 1
Et
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
Ys,F,t+1St+1P
∗
F,t+1
Et
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
Ys,F,t+1
= (15)
where the firm index j can be dropped since all firms will choose the same optimal price,223
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implying Ps,F,t = pF,t−1.224
3.5. Exogenous Shocks225
The logarithm of the exogenous shocks ZN,t, ZH,t, P
∗
H,t, P
∗
M,t, P
∗
F,t are assumed to follow226
first-order autocorrelated stochastic processes, with identical AR(1) coefficient ρ, and inno-227
vation of the shock Xt denoted by εXt . We assume that (log) foreign nominal consumption228
µ∗t = P
∗
t C
∗
t follows an AR(1) process.229
3.6. The Ramsey Policy230
In this section we set up the Ramsey problem and characterize the trade-off across policy231
objectives, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate and the welfare outcomes, conditional232
on the optimal policy. Appendix A provides the mathematical details for the derivation of233
all results in this section.234
3.6.1. First Order Conditions for the Ramsey Plan235
The domestic monetary authority solves the problem of a benevolent policymaker max-236
imizing the household’s objective function conditional on the first order conditions of the237
competitive equilibrium. This approach provides the (constrained efficient) equilibrium se-238
quences of endogenous variables solving the Ramsey problem.8 We assume that the steady-239
state mark-up is eliminated through subsidies.240
Exploiting the result that under our assumptions equilibrium employment is independent241
of policy, and similarly to Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), we can express the welfare function242
in terms of nominal consumption µt ≡ PtCt, and the price level. The Ramsey problem can243
then be written as:244
max
µt,Pt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log
(
µt
Pt
)]
+ t.i.p. (16)
subject to245
Pt = κNP
γn
N,t
(
κH
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t
)γH
P 1−γHF,t
)1−γn
(17)
8For a discussion of the Ramsey approach to optimal policy, see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), Benigno
and Woodford (2006), Khan et al. (2003), Coenen et al., 2009.
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where246
PF,t = κF
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)(1−γF )(
Et−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF
(18)
PN,t = Et−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt (19)
κF , κN , κH are convolutions of preferences and technology parameters,
µt
κµ∗t
= St and t.i.p.247
indicates terms independent of policy.248
The first order condition for the Ramsey problem can be written in terms of a trade-off249
across the two variables ξN,t and ξF,t :250
1 = (1− Γ) ξN,t + ΓξF,t (20)
where
Γ ≡
γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
γn + γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
ξN,t ≡
Z−1N,tWt
Et−1
(
Z−1N,tWt
) ≡ MCnomN,t
pN,t
ξF,t ≡
StP
∗
F,t
Et−1
(
StP ∗F,t
) ≡ MCnomF,t
pF,t
The variables ξN,t and ξF,t are the real marginal cost in the non-tradable and in the sticky-251
price import sector. Since the real marginal cost is also equal to the inverse of the mark-up,252
it also measures the deviation from efficiency caused by price stickiness.253
Under flexible prices the inefficiency wedges are equal to 1. It is easy to check that this254
value satisfies the first order condition.9 In general, the policymaker will not be able to255
replicate the flexible price allocation when prices in the non-tradable and import sector are256
sticky.257
The first order condition (20) describes how the policymaker should trade off deviations258
from the profit-maximizing mark-up in the F and N sectors to keep welfare at the optimal259
9This result is consistent with Faia and Monacelli (2008),where under log-preferences in consumption
and Cobb-Douglas aggregators, the first best in a SOE with complete markets and sticky prices coincides
with the flexible price allocation.
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level. Consistently with results in the literature,10 if preferences are such that only one260
nominal rigidity is relevant for the equilibrium, no trade-off across inefficiency wedges ex-261
ists. The Ramsey policy calls then for completely stabilizing the single inefficient mark-up,262
and is able to replicate the flexible-price allocation. This will occur if households purchase263
exclusively non-tradable goods (γn = 1), domestically produced goods (γH = 1), or if the264
share of LCP importers is nil (γF = 0) - in which case the weight Γ on the F sector markup265
stabilization objective is zero - and will also occur if household purchase exclusively tradable266
goods (γn = 0) - in which case the weight (1 − Γ) on the N sector markup stabilization267
objective is zero.11268
The trade-off across the two objectives depends on the parameters γn, γH , γF , but not269
on the share of imported intermediates in domestic production, γv. To examine the role of270
the weights in the trade-off, it is useful to assume that the share of LCP importers γF is271
equal to 1. Then,272
Γ = 1−
γn
γn + (1− γH) (1− γn)
(21)
Eq. (21) shows that a fall in γH results in an increase in the weight Γ on the F sector273
markup. Since a larger share of imported F goods (and a corresponding smaller share of H274
goods) in the tradable basket increase the welfare cost of inefficient fluctuations in ξF,t, the275
optimal policy calls for an increase in the relative weight given to this objective. Similarly,276
an increase in γn results in a decrease of the weight Γ, and an increase in the weight (1− Γ)277
given to movements in ξN,t.278
10See for example Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Corsetti (2006), Corsetti et al.
(2012), Corsetti et al. (2010b), Devereux and Engel (2003), Devereux and Engel (2007), Smets and Wouters
(2002), Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) and Faia and Monacelli (2008).
11For γF = 0 and γn = 0 the Ramsey allocation is implemented respectively by the policy St =(
Z−1N,tH
η
t P
∗
t C
∗
t
)−1
Et−1
(
Z−1t H
η
t P
∗
t C
∗
t
)
and St = P
∗−1
F,t Et−1
(
P ∗F,t
)
. The allocation can also be implemented
by the policies St =
(
Z−1N,tH
η
t µ
∗
t
)−1
and St = P
∗−1
F,t respectively, which correspond to price stability in PN
and pF , but do not imply an iid process for St, as we have assumed in the text. Since with preset prices
firms fully incorporate the forecastable component of variables in their pricing decision, price stability is not
necessary to implement the flexible price allocation.
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3.6.2. Optimal Exchange Rate Volatility and the Welfare Cost of a Peg279
Using the first order conditions for the Ramsey problem, this section provides the optimal280
policy implications for exchange rate volatility and the welfare cost of an exchange rate peg.281
As there is no closed form solution when γF 6= 0 and γn 6= 0, we assess welfare up to the
second order of accuracy. To this aim we obtain the second-order accurate law of motion for
St. Write eq. (20) as:
1 = (1− Γ)
Z−1N,t
(
P ∗H,tZH,t
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)) 1(γv)
St
Et−1
(
Z−1N,t
(
ZH,t
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)) 1(γv)
St
) + Γ StP ∗F,t
Et−1
(
StP ∗F,t
) .
The first-order accurate solution for the exchange rate is282
S˜t = − (1− Γ)
(
−εZN,t +
1
γv
(
εP ∗
H,t
+ εZH,t − (1− γv)εP ∗M,t
))
− ΓεP ∗
F,t
, (22)
where a tilde denotes log deviations. The second order accurate solution is given by283
S˜t = − (1− Γ)
(
−εZN,t +
1
γv
(
εP ∗
H,t
+ εZH,t − (1− γv)εP ∗M,t
))
− ΓεP ∗
F,t
−
(1− Γ) Γ
2
[
X˜2t + P˜
∗ 2
F,t − 2X˜tP˜
∗
F,t −Et−1
(
X˜2t + P˜
∗ 2
F,t − 2X˜tP˜
∗
F,t
)]
where X˜t ≡ −Z˜N,t +
1
γv
(
P˜ ∗H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv)P˜
∗
M,t
)
.12284
Inspection of the equations describing the dynamics of the exchange rate under the285
optimal policy shows that the optimal exchange rate response to shocks is i.i.d., that is286
Et−1(S˜t) = 0. The intuition is as follows. Under one-period preset prices, the economy can287
revert to the efficient equilibrium one period after the shock. The policymaker only needs288
to adjust the exchange rate when an unexpected shock affects the economy, since firms can289
set the optimal price in response to expected shocks. Therefore, the exchange rate needs to290
depart from the steady-state only on impact, and to revert to the steady state once prices291
12Note that variables entering linearly in the expressions for S˜t are evaluated at second-order of accuracy,
while variables entering as squares or cross-products are evaluated at first-order of accuracy (see Lombardo
and Sutherland, 2007).
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will be able to adjust to their efficient value (i.e. absent further shocks).292
It is instructive to discuss the optimal exchange rate dynamics derived in eq. (22) together293
with the welfare outcome under the optimal policy. The welfare gain of adopting the optimal294
policy, relative to an exchange rate peg, is295
Woptimal0 −W
peg
0 =
1
2
{
γn (1− Γ)σ
2
N +
+γn (1− Γ)
1
(γv)
2
[
σ2∗H + σ
2
H + (1− γv)
2σ∗2M
]
+ (23)
+γF (1− γH) (1− γn) Γσ
∗2
F
}
where σ2j ≡ Eε
2
j .296
It is clear from this expression that the welfare gain depends on two sets of parameters:297
the variance of the exogenous processes, and the parameters governing preferences, technol-298
ogy and pass-through of the exchange rate. Eqs. (22) and (23) show the share of imported299
intermediate inputs (1 − γv), while irrelevant for the trade-off, plays an important role for300
the optimal volatility of the exchange rate, and consequently for the welfare cost of deviating301
from it. The larger the share (1− γv), the larger are the welfare costs of fixing the exchange302
rate, if the economy is hit by either the domestic tradable shock, εH,t, the foreign tradable303
shock, ε∗H,t or the shock to the imported intermediate goods, ε
∗
M,t, other things equal and for304
all values of the other parameters. The share of of non-tradable goods increases the cost of305
the peg for the same set of shocks plus the non-tradable shock, other things equal and for306
all values of the other parameters. It decreases the cost of the peg for the shock to imported307
goods, ε∗F,t. The impact on the cost from pegging the exchange rate of γH goes in the same308
direction as for γn, while the share of LCP producers, γF , has an opposite effect relative to309
γn.310
The interpretation of eqs. (22) and (23) is facilitated by assuming that the share of LCP311
importers γF is equal to 1. In this case, the relative weight in the optimal trade-off equation312
is given by eq. (21). The welfare cost of a peg, relative to the optimal policy, is equal to313
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Woptimal0 −W
peg
0 =
1
2
{
γ2n
γn + (1− γH)(1− γn)
σ2N +
+
γ2n
γn + (1− γH)(1− γn)
(
1
γv
)2 [
σ2∗H + σ
2
H + (1− γv)
2σ∗2M
]
+ (24)
+ [(1− γH) (1− γn)]
2 1
γn + (1− γH)(1− γn)
σ∗2F
}
.
Consider the impact of a fall in γH on the welfare measureW
optimal
0 −W
peg
0 . A larger share314
of imported F goods (and a corresponding smaller share of H goods) in the tradable basket315
increase the welfare cost of inefficient fluctuations in ξF,t. Since stabilizing ξF,t in response316
to shocks to the foreign price P ∗F,t calls for accommodating the foreign price fluctuations317
through movements in the nominal exchange rate St, as shown in eq. (22), the welfare cost318
of a peg increases.319
The direct effect of the fall in γH on the welfare measure is summarized by the third term320
of eq. (24). The first two terms of eq. (24) summarize instead the indirect effect of the fall321
in γH on welfare, and they lead to a decrease in the cost of pegging the exchange rate. First,322
note that if the share of value added in domestic production γv is equal to 1, the first two323
terms of eq. (24) share the same weight, and the volatilities σ2N , σ
2∗
H , σ
2
H enter symmetrically324
in the welfare measure. Then, the cost of an exchange rate peg is smaller as γH falls since325
the optimal policy calls for smaller volatility in St when accommodating shocks to ZN,t, ZH,t,326
P ∗H,t whenever the weight on the objective ξF,t increases in the trade-off. Changes in St - as327
shown in eq. (22) - are needed to ensure that the markup ξN,t is stabilized while at the same328
time ensuring that the cross-sector efficient production conditions are met. Since movements329
in St to stabilize ξN,t indirectly result in movements in ξF,t even if the foreign price P
∗
F,t is330
stable, a lower γH leads to a larger volatility in ξN,t and a correspondingly lower volatility331
in St through the first two terms of eq. (24).332
3.7. The Role of Openness333
In this section we discuss how openness affects the optimal policy, and the role of exchange334
rate volatility in implementing the optimal policy.335
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3.7.1. Openness and Policy Trade-off336
Our first result is that openness need not be correlated with the trade-off faced by the337
policymaker. Openness is governed by three parameters: the share of imported inputs in the338
production of tradable goods (1 − γv), the share of non-tradable goods in consumption γn,339
and the degree of home bias γH in the consumption of tradable goods. Yet the parameter340
γv does not enter into the equation (20) describing how to trade off the inefficiency wedges,341
as the relative weight of the two inefficient sectors is independent of this parameter. Thus342
two economies with different degree of openness may find that the optimal policy calls for343
trading off distortions at an identical rate.344
Our second result is that the composition of imports can affect the welfare cost of alterna-
tive policies regardless of whether it affects the trade-off. This result can be easily illustrated
in the case of γF = 0. If pricing in the import sector is efficient (ξF,t = 1), the first order
condition (20) calls for setting ξN,t = 1, regardless of the share of imported intermediates in
production, of the non-tradable goods share, or of the home bias in consumption. In this
case, the optimal exchange rate is given by
S˜t =
(
εZN,t −
1
γv
(
εP ∗
H,t
+ εZH,t − (1− γv)εP ∗M,t
))
implying that the share of imported intermediates γv directly affects optimal exchange rate345
volatility. Moreover, since the welfare cost Woptimal0 − W
peg
0 depends both on the optimal346
exchange rate volatility, and on the size of the sectors with nominal rigidities, both the347
parameters γv and γn will affect the welfare cost of choosing a fixed exchange rate policy.348
3.7.2. Openness and Optimal Exchange Rate Volatility349
The role of exchange rate movements in achieving the optimal allocation can be illustrated350
by examining how shocks affect the inefficiency wedges in the economy.351
The propagation of shocks and relative price misalignments The Ramsey policy352
uses movements in the nominal exchange rate to smooth out inefficient movements in mark-353
ups. Wage equalization is the key propagation mechanism of shocks across sectors. Consider354
the case when the only nominal rigidity is in the N sector. The Ramsey policy calls for355
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completely stabilizing ξN,t. Under a peg, eq. (12) implies that in response to a shock P
∗
H,t,356
ZH,t or P
∗
M,t the nominal wage must change. This leads to a corresponding increase in the357
wage in the N sector. An increase in Wt will lead to a deviation of ξN,t from its constant358
optimal value. Similarly, a shock to ZN,t would require inefficient fluctuations in ξN,t under359
a peg, since the price pN,t−1 is predetermined and the wage is set at the level required to360
meet the H sector profit maximization condition (12).361
The Ramsey policy prevents movements inWt, which would result through equations (10)362
and (12) in a misalignment of the relative price PHt/PNt from its efficient level. Equation363
(22) shows that (to first order) the optimal response to a positive technology shock in the364
non-tradable goods sector consist of a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Under365
flexible prices, a positive technology shock in the non-tradable goods sector would bring366
about a fall in the price of non-traded goods relative to other goods. A depreciation of367
the nominal exchange rate provides the same relative price adjustment: all other goods will368
become more expensive relative to the non-traded good. In the absence of other shocks369
and with no LCP producers, the optimal exchange rate response would be to exactly offset370
the technology shock. On the other hand, if a trade-off is present, the adjustment is not371
1-to-1 but 1-to-(1− Γ). This is due to the fact that, in the presence of LCP producers,372
an adjustment of the exchange rate will generate volatility in the import sector mark-up,373
resulting in a loss of efficiency.13374
The role of imported intermediate goods The share of intermediate imports in
the H−sector production affects the size of the optimal exchange rate adjustment. In the
cases when the Ramsey policy calls for completely stabilizing ξN,t, the exchange rate would
be set to completely offset the impact of any change in P ∗H,t, ZH,t or P
∗
M,t on the nominal
wage Wt. This would in turn prevent fluctuations in ξN,t resulting from a change in Wt
13We have assumed that there are no intermediate goods in the production of non-traded goods. Nev-
ertheless, we can see that the presence of intermediate goods in the production of non-traded goods would
make the cost of imported materials increase following a depreciation, hence partially offsetting the down-
ward pressure on costs exerted by the gains in total factor productivity. A depreciation would hence make
the inefficiency wedge ξN,t open by less, thus requiring a milder intervention by the policymaker.
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spilling-over across sectors.14 The required adjustment depends on γv, as can be seen by
taking a log-linear approximation to eq. (12):
S˜t − W˜t = −
1
γv
Z˜H,t −
1
γv
P˜ ∗H,t +
1− γv
γv
P˜ ∗M,t
A smaller γv, or a larger share of imported intermediates in production, will require optimally375
a larger adjustment in the nominal exchange rate. As a consequence, the welfare cost of a376
peg increases as γv falls, as shown by eq. (23). The optimal response to an unexpected377
increase of the price of imported intermediates P ∗M,t calls for a depreciation of the exchange378
rate, so to leave wages unchanged. As for shocks in the domestically produced traded good,379
either due to changes in technology ZH,t or to fluctuations in the international price P
∗
H,t, the380
optimal response of the exchange rate consists in an appreciation. The logic is symmetric381
to the case of shocks in the non-traded goods sector: an appreciation can fully offset the382
impact of the unexpected change of P ∗H,t or ZH,t on the nominal wage, and thus on ξN,t, by383
respectively keeping the domestic currency price PH,t constant, or by lowering it to increase384
the real wage of workers in sector H . Fully offsetting the shock will be optimal only if the385
share of intermediate imports in production is equal to zero. Additionally, in the presence386
of LCP producers, the exchange rate adjustment has to trade-off the fact that the efficiency387
wedge in the import sector will be affected.388
The role of asymmetric shocks In our model, the existence of imported intermedi-389
ates affects the optimal policy and welfare only if they enter asymmetrically in the production390
sectors H and N. Under the optimal policy, the exchange rate must move to prevent rela-391
tive price misalignments across consumption goods, which are the result of shocks affecting392
asymmetrically each sector. If relative prices do not need to change, a fixed exchange rate393
can implement the optimal allocation.394
This can be easily seen in the case the Ramsey policy calls for completely stabilizing ξN,t.
14In an online appendix, we extend the numerical analysis to the case of frictions in the labor market
that break the equality of wages across sectors. As expected, the results are quantitatively affected, since
wages in the two sectors adjust only partially to shocks. We establish numerically that our conclusions on
the impact of openness on the welfare of alternative policies also hold in a model with quadratic costs of
labor reallocation across sectors.
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If the share of intermediates in the H sector γv is equal to the share in the N sector, denoted
γvn, efficiency in production in both sectors implies:
StP
∗
H,t
PN,t
ξN,t =
ZN,t
ZH,t
implying the optimal adjustment to St in response to a shock ZN,t, ZH,t or P
∗
H,t is independent
of γv, γvn. Additionally, the optimal policy calls for no adjustment to St in response to a P
∗
M,t
shock. In general, for (1− γv) and (1− γvn) different from zero, the efficiency wedge in the
non-traded sector (ξN,t) can be rewritten as
ξN,t ≡
Z−1N,t (H
η
t µ
∗
t )
γvn
(
P ∗M,t
)1−γvn
St
Et−1
(
Z−1N,t (H
η
t µ
∗
t )
γvn
(
P ∗M,t
)1−γvn
St
) .
The optimal exchange rate policy is then
St =
Et−1
(
Z−1N,t (H
η
t µ
∗
t )
γvn
(
P ∗M,t
)1−γvn)
Z−1N,t (H
η
t µ
∗
t )
γvn
(
P ∗M,t
)1−γvn .
where (Hηt µ
∗
t )
γvn = Gt
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)
γv
γvn
and Gt is a convolution of exogenous variables. If395
γvn = γn, both the denominator and the numerator will be independent of P
∗
M,t.396
Finally, the optimal response to an increase of the price of foreign goods P ∗F,t consists of397
an appreciation of the exchange rate. As for this shock, the optimal response as well as the398
cost of pegging the exchange rate are independent of the share of imported intermediates in399
production. Except for a polar case in which Γ = 1, the response of the exchange rate is400
less than 1-to-1 to allow for the fact that the exchange rate adjustment will also affect the401
efficiency wedge in the non-tradable sector, through its effect on the domestically produced402
tradable sector price PH,t and, hence, on wages in all sectors.403
Optimal Exchange Rate Volatility and Home Bias A number of papers inves-404
tigate the relationship between optimal exchange rate volatility and the degree of open-405
ness, in models where all goods are tradable. In these models, the home bias parameter406
fully characterizes openness. Faia and Monacelli (2008) find that exchange rate volatility is407
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(monotonically) increasing in the degree of home-bias, and thus decreasing in openness.408
Note that in our model409
σ2
S˜t
= (1− Γ)2
(
σ2ZN,t +
1
γ2v
(
σ2P ∗
H,t
+ σ2ZH,t + (1− γv)
2σ2P ∗
M,t
))
+ Γ2σ2P ∗
F,t
. (25)
As the home bias γH increases, the weight of the variance of the shocks in the first term on410
the right-hand-side of the equation increases, while the weight of the variance of the shocks411
P ∗F,t decreases. Therefore the sign of the correlation between γH and σ
2
S˜t
is ambiguous, and412
is more likely to be negative if γv is large.413
Moreover, eq. (25) shows that the link between openness and optimal exchange rate414
volatility depend on all the parameters determining the composition of imports, through the415
term Γ, even conditionally on a specific shock.416
4. Results in a Parameterized Model with Capital and Staggered Price Adjust-417
ment418
This section expands the simple framework of Section 3 to provide a model that can be419
parameterized using macroeconomic and trade data, and used to assess quantitatively the420
impact of the composition of trade flows on policy choices and welfare outcomes.421
We assume CES aggregators for preferences and technologies, introduce sector-specific422
capital, incomplete financial markets, and staggered price adjustment in place of one-period423
preset prices. This generalization implies that the Ramsey policymaker has an incentive to424
manipulate the nominal exchange rate because of its impact on the relative price of tradable425
and non-tradable goods.426
We maintain our assumption that all tradable goods are priced in international markets,427
so that the interpretation of the trade-offs in the stylized model of Section 3 carries over to428
the numerical analysis. This pricing assumption is well suited for emerging market economies429
that produce, and export, commoditized goods. Additionally, our assumption is consistent430
with the implications for nominal variables of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in a small open431
economy model (see Ravenna and Natalucci (2008)).432
Details on the optimality and market-clearing conditions are in Appendix B.433
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4.1. Model Setup434
4.1.1. Consumption, Investment, and Price Composites435
Household preferences are defined over the index Ct, a composite of non-tradable and436
tradable good consumption, CN,t and CT,t respectively:437
Ct =
[
(γcn)
1
ρcn (CN,t)
ρcn−1
ρcn + (1− γcn)
1
ρcn (CT,t)
ρcn−1
ρcn
] ρcn
ρcn−1
(26)
where 0 ≤ γcn ≤ 1 is the share of the N good and ρcn > 0 is the elasticity of substitution438
between N and T goods. The tradable consumption good is a composite of home and foreign439
tradable goods, CH,t and CF,t, respectively:440
CT,t =
[
(γch)
1
ρch (CH,t)
ρch−1
ρch + (1− γch)
1
ρch (CF,t)
ρch−1
ρch
] ρch
ρch−1
(27)
where 0 ≤ γch ≤ 1 is the share of the H good and ρch > 0 is the elasticity of substitution441
between H and F goods. The non-tradable consumption good N is an aggregate defined442
over a continuum of differentiated goods:443
CN,t =
[∫ 1
0
C
̺−1
̺
N,t (z)dz
] ̺
̺−1
(28)
with ̺ > 1. Define P ct , P
c
T,t, and PN,t as the consumer price index (CPI), the price index for444
T consumption goods, and the price index for N consumption goods, respectively. The terms445
of trade for consumption and intermediate imports, and the consumption-based (internal)446
real exchange rate are defined respectively as
PF,t
PH,t
,
PM,t
PH,t
and
P cT,t
PN,t
.447
Investment in the non-tradable and domestic tradable sector INt , I
T
t is defined in a similar448
manner - a composite of N , H , and F goods. However, we assume that the share and449
elasticity parameters γin, γih, ρin, ρih, may differ from those of the consumption composites.450
4.1.2. Households451
Consider a cashless economy where the preferences of the representative household are452
given by453
V = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
Dt(lnCt)− ℓ
(Ht)
1+ηL
1 + ηL
}
(29)
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where Dt is an exogenous preference shock, ηL is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity and454
Ht is the total supply of labor hours, defined as Ht = H
N
t +H
H
t . Let Bt (B
∗
t ) denote holdings455
of discount bonds denominated in domestic (foreign) currency, vt (v
∗
t ) the corresponding456
price, RNt (R
H
t ) the real return to capital that is rented to firms in the N (H) sector, P
i
t the457
investment basket price index, and Tt government lump-sum taxes. The household’s budget458
constraint is then given by459
P ct Ct + StB
∗
t v
∗
t +Btvt + P
i
t I
N
t + P
i
t I
H
t = W
H
t H
H
t +W
N
t H
N
t + (30)
StB
∗
t−1 +Bt−1 + PN,tR
N
t K
N
t−1 + PH,tR
H
t K
H
t−1 +Πt
Capital in each sector can be accumulated according to the laws of motion:460
KNt = Φ
(
INt
KNt−1
)
KNt−1 + (1− δ)K
N
t−1 (31)
461
KHt = Φ
(
IHt
KHt−1
)
KHt−1 + (1− δ)K
H
t−1 (32)
We assume that installed capital, contrary to labor, is sector-specific. Capital accumulation462
incurs adjustment costs, with Φ′ (•) > 0 and Φ′′ (•) < 0.463
4.1.3. Firms464
Non-tradable (N) Sector. The non-tradable sector is populated by a continuum of monopo-465
listically competitive firms owned by households. Each firm z ∈ [0, 1] combines an imported466
intermediate good, MN,t, and domestic value added, VN,t according to the production func-467
tion:468
YN,t(z) =
[
(γnv)
1
ρnv (VN,t(z))
ρnv−1
ρnv + (1− γnv)
1
ρnv (MN,t(z))
ρnv−1
ρnv
] ρnv
ρnv−1
(33)
Domestic value added is produced using labor and sector-specific capital as inputs:
VN,t(z) = A
N
t [K
N
t−1(z)]
αn [HNt (z)]
1−αn
where ANt is an exogenous productivity shock. The domestic currency price of the imported469
intermediate good is given by PM,t = StP
∗
M,t where P
∗
M,t follows an exogenous stochastic470
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processes. Given the first order conditions for factor demands and the aggregate demand471
schedule YN,t(z) =
[
PN,t(z)
PN,t
]−̺
(CN,t+I
H
N,t+I
N
N,t), firm z maximizes expected discounted profits472
by choosing the optimal price PN,t(z). We assume firms are able to optimally reset the price473
with probability (1−ϑ) in each period, following the Calvo (1983) pricing mechanism. Non-474
resetting firms satisfy demand at the previously posted price. Aggregation over the N sector475
producers gives the standard new Keynesian forward-looking price adjustment equation for476
non-tradable good inflation.477
Domestic Tradable (H) Sector. The tradable good H is produced both at home and abroad478
in a perfectly competitive environment, where the law of one price holds:479
PH,t = StP
∗
H,t (34)
The price for the foreign-produced H good P ∗H,t follows an exogenous stochastic process. Do-480
mestic producers combine an imported intermediate good, MH,t, and domestic value added,481
VH,t, according to the production function:482
YH,t =
[
(γv)
1
ρv (VH,t)
ρv−1
ρv + (1− γv)
1
ρv (MH,t)
ρv−1
ρv
] ρv
ρv−1
(35)
Domestic value added is produced using labor and sector-specific capital as inputs:483
VH,t = A
H
t
(
KHt−1
)αh (HHt )1−αh (36)
where AHt is an exogenous productivity shock.484
4.1.4. Foreign Sector485
We assume that the foreign-produced good F is purchased by a continuum of monopo-
listically competitive firms in the import sector as an input for production. Each firm z can
costlessly differentiate the imported good XF to produce a consumption good CF (z) and
an investment good IF (z) using the production technology YF (z) = XF (z), where XF (z)
denotes the amount of input imported by firm z. The nominal marginal cost of producing
one unit of output is defined asMCF,nomt (z) = StP
∗
F,t where P
∗
F,t is the foreign-currency price
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of XF and follows an exogenous stochastic process. The producer faces an aggregate demand
schedule given by:
YF,t(z) =
[
PF,t(z)
PF,t
]−̺
(CF,t + I
H
F,t + I
N
F,t)
where YF,t(z) = CF,t(z)+I
H
F,t(z)+I
N
F,t(z). The domestic-currency price PF (z) is set by solving486
an optimal pricing problem symmetrical to the one solved by firms in the N sector, following487
Calvo (1983). The state-independent probability of resetting the price at every period t is488
equal to (1 − ϑF ). As in Monacelli (2005), this production structure generates deviations489
from the law of one price in the short run, while asymptotically the pass-through from the490
price of the imported good to the price of the consumption and investment basket F is491
complete. We will refer to this pricing arrangement as the Local Currency Pricing (LCP)492
case. Alternatively, when producers can optimally reset prices every period, the domestic-493
currency price of good F is PF,t = µFStP
∗
F,t where µF is a constant mark-up.494
4.2. Trade Openness and Welfare495
Conditional on a constant exogenous volatility, we study how optimal exchange rate496
volatility and the welfare cost Woptimal0 −W
peg
0 of a fixed exchange rate are affected by the497
preference and technology parameters γch, γih, γv, γcn, γin, ρcn, and ρin. In equilibrium, these498
parameters map into different degrees of openness and different compositions of imports.15499
We present results for economies where the parameters defining the composition of imports500
vary across the whole admissible range, and for economies where the import and tradable501
shares in the consumption and investment aggregates, and the share of intermediates in502
production, are estimated from input-output data.503
15The parameters γch, γih, γv are equal in steady state to the shares CH/CT , I
J
H/I
J
T , XH/YH . Implicitly,
the ratios CH/CF and IH/IF also depend each exclusively upon γch, γih. The parameters γcn, γin do not
uniquely define the steady state tradable shares CT /C, I
J
T /I
J , since these will depend on the endogenous
internal real exchange rates
P iT,t
PN,t
,
P cT,t
PN,t
and on the elasticities ρcn, ρin. When parameterizing the model
consistently with the input-output table data, we obtain that the value for γnv is at the upper end of
the parameter space. Thus the data prefer a specification where non-traded goods are produced without
imported intermediates.
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4.2.1. The Ramsey Policy and the Incentive to Deviate from Price Stability504
We first examine the behaviour of a parameterized economy under the Ramsey policy.505
The values for γch, γih, γv, γcn, γin, ρcn, and ρin are set equal to the estimates obtained506
matching the model’s steady state with data obtained from input-output tables for the507
Czech Republic (see Table 2). Given these estimates, the parameterization of the exoge-508
nous stochastic process is chosen to ensure a business cycle behavior consistent with data509
from emerging market economies, assuming monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with i.i.d.510
shocks. In the model, business cycle fluctuations are generated by three domestic shocks511
(total factor productivity in the tradable and non-tradable good sector and shifts in house-512
hold preferences) and four foreign shocks (price of the domestically-produced tradable good,513
price of the imported intermediate input, price of the imported tradable good and interest514
rate on foreign-denominated debt). Appendix C provides details on the parameterization515
and the business cycle properties of the model.516
Table 3 shows the volatility of inflation in the non-tradable sector relative to the volatility517
of non-tradable output. Under complete markets the policymaker brings about larger de-518
viations from mark-up stability than under incomplete markets. Faia and Monacelli (2008)519
have shown that, in a small open economy, perfect risk sharing (i.e. complete international520
financial markets) creates an incentive for the Ramsey policymaker to deviate from price521
stability. This incentive is due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, by engineering an exchange522
rate depreciation the Ramsey policymaker can increase domestic consumption relative to523
foreign.16 Our result extends their findings by showing that, under incomplete markets, the524
incentive to deviate from mark-up stability is muted relative to the case of complete markets.525
Furthermore, our result complements the result discussed by Corsetti et al. (2012) showing526
that the cooperative policymaker in a two-country model with incomplete markets has an527
incentive to trade off price stability with the desire to increase risk sharing. Table 3 therefore528
16De Paoli (2009b) compares different monetary policy rules with the optimal monetary policy under
complete and incomplete financial markets in a small open economy, but does not provide a comparison of
optimal inflation volatility across alternative financial market assumptions. Pesenti and Tille (2004) discuss
the incentive to deviate from prices stability that emerges in a non-cooperative policy game under complete
markets are present. In the two-country version of our model with complete financial markets, price stability
supports the cooperative allocation.
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suggests that in a non-cooperative policy setting, incomplete markets could result in more529
stable prices than under complete markets.530
4.2.2. The Welfare Impact of the Composition of Imports531
We present results for the optimal volatility of the nominal exchange rate and the532
welfare outcome of alternative policy choices in economies where the parameters γch, γih,533
γv, γcn, γin, ρcn, and ρin defining the composition of imports vary across the whole admis-534
sible range, keeping constant the other parameters of the model535
Welfare is measured by the unconditional expectation of the representative household’s536
lifetime utility. As we have log-preferences in consumption, welfare units are equivalent to537
deterministic steady-state consumption units.538
Figure 1 shows welfare isoquants as a function of the share of domestic value added in539
tradable output γv and the bias for non-tradable goods in domestic demand γn for four540
separate values of the home-bias parameter γh. For ease of interpretation of the figures, we541
assume γin = γcn = γn and γih = γch = γh.542
Consider the welfare loss as a function of γn, for a large value of γv, implying a low share543
of imported inputs. The loss from fixing the exchange rate increases with γn. While Figure 1544
suggests that the welfare loss from fixing the exchange rate increases the more the economy is545
closed to trade, this result does not hold unconditionally in our economy. Moving along the546
horizontal axis, for any given share of non-traded goods, the figure shows that as γv decreases,547
so that tradable goods are produced with a larger amount of imported intermediates, the548
welfare loss increases, even if the economy is more open to trade with the rest of the world.549
This behavior of the welfare function reflects the incentive for the policymaker to move the550
exchange rate to prevent misalignments in relative prices, highlighted by Mundell (1961) and551
Friedman (1953). In our model, where international relative prices are exogenous, exchange552
rate movements can prevent misalignment between tradable and non-tradable prices. The553
smaller γv, and the larger the share of imported intermediates in domestic production, the554
larger the role played by the exchange rate in preventing inefficient adjustments in the price555
of non-tradables. This result is consistent with the analytical results discussed in Section 3,556
and summarized in eq. (23).557
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Traditional measures of openness that ignore the composition of imports are close to558
uncorrelated with our welfare measure. Figure 1 showed that being more open through559
a low γcn or a low γv has opposite effects on the cost of a peg. The relationship between560
openness, the composition of imports and welfare can be examined directly using the contour561
plots. The isoquants for our measure of openness - the steady state share of imports to GDP562
- are overlaid to the welfare isoquants in Figure 1 . This figure is best read by starting from563
any curve corresponding to a particular degree of openness. Moving along the curve different564
values for the welfare cost of a peg are found. Along the isoquants representing openness,565
the same degree of openness is consistent with different compositions of the demand and566
production input mix. The fact that isoquants of the imports/GDP ratio are not parallel to567
the ones of the welfare loss implies that the welfare cost of fixing the exchange rate may be568
vastly different, for a given degree of openness. As a consequence, two countries with the569
same degree of openness can experience different losses from pegging the exchange rate.17570
Consider the impact of γh, shown across the four different panels. Under incomplete571
pass-through a change in γh changes the share of the tradable good absorption across the572
F and H good, and thus the share of the sector with inefficient staggered price adjustment573
for given γn. Figure 1 shows that a change in γh affects the openness measure, but has a574
modest effect on the welfare loss for a given level of openness. Eq. (23) provides intuition575
for this result. As γh falls, increasing the overall stickiness of the tradable aggregate, the576
first two terms of the welfare gap will decrease, while the third term will increase. Thus the577
overall impact on the welfare cost of fixing the exchange rate depends on the relative size of578
the variance of the shocks.579
Welfare Outcomes in Representative Economies Conditional on Trade Composition Data. In580
this section we examine the welfare cost of pegging the exchange rate for specific combinations581
of the parameters γch, γih, γcn, γin, γv, ρcn, ρin affecting the demand, import and production582
17Our estimates of γv and γcn capture very well the degree of openess in the sample. Defining openness ≡
export
GDP
+
Imp.Inv.
GDP
+
Imp.Cons.
GDP
+
Imp.Interm.
GDP
and regressing openness on γcn and γv we obtain
Openness = 4
[13.5]
−3.65
[−7.87]
γv −2.12
[−8.07]
γcn : R
2 = 0.89,
where t-statistics are in square brackets and where we have omitted γin as its correlation with γcn is 0.996.
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composition of the model, rather than having these parameters vary independently across a583
given range. We estimate the parameters by minimizing the norm of the distance between584
eight steady state ratios computed from the OECD input-output tables data and those585
produced by the model. Table 4 compares the moments in the data and as returned by the586
estimation for two sample countries, Germany and the Czech Republic. We set the other587
parameters, including the volatility of exogenous shocks, at the values used in our benchmark588
parameterization. In the estimation we impose Beta priors on the γ and Gamma priors on589
the ρ parameters. All priors have very large standard deviations. The use of priors reduces590
the chance that our numerical algorithm generates large differences in parameter estimates591
starting from small differences in moment conditions. Figure 2 shows the estimates for the592
seven parameters, conditional on each set of steady state ratios for the 25 countries in our593
data set.594
This experiment is of interest since variability across parameters combinations does not595
necessarily translate into variability across welfare outcomes for a given policy. Our represen-596
tative economies may be different across dimensions that prove to be irrelevant for welfare.597
Additionally, the analysis in the previous section assumed that all parameter combinations,598
and the implied import composition, are equally likely, while the estimated parameters may599
be correlated, so that some parameter combinations are not observed at all in the data.600
Given our parameterization, the welfare losses from pegging the exchange rate relative601
to the Ramsey policy range from about 0.06% to about 0.23% of steady-state consumption602
(Table 5). Similar values can be found in the literature assessing sub-optimal policies in603
DSGE models (e.g. Coenen et al., 2009).18 Figure 3 shows a bubble-plot of the welfare losses604
in relation to the share of consumption demand for non-tradable goods and the parameter γcn,605
the households’ bias for non-tradable consumption. The radius of the circles is proportional606
to the welfare loss. Although for convenience we assign the name of a country as to each607
combination of parameters, we are examining welfare outcomes for representative economies,608
rather than for specific countries, since we do not estimate the country-specific volatility of609
18The losses are sensitive to the definition of the tradability measure used to compute input shares. For
example using a country-specific tradability threshold equal to the import share of the wholesale and retail
sector, as in Bems (2008), the estimated parameters would generate losses that are about three times as
large.
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the exogenous shocks driving the business cycle.610
The estimates show that very large economies (e.g. Japan, US) - for which the export611
over GDP ratio is low - are the ones for which the cost of limiting the flexibility in the612
exchange rate has the highest cost. We do not find, in general, a high correlation between613
measures of openness and welfare loss, showing that the composition of imports plays an614
important role. Portugal and Mexico, for example, have similar degree of openness in terms615
of exports over GDP, yet the cost of pegging the exchange rate is more than twice as large616
for Mexico than for Portugal. Figure 3 shows instead a large positive correlation between617
the households’ bias for non-tradable consumption γcn and the cost of pegging the exchange618
rate. In our model, the tradable share in consumption depends on the steady state value of619
PT/PN and so can differ from γcn. In our exercise, we find that the correlation of the non-620
tradable goods share in consumption with γcn and with the welfare loss is equal respectively621
to 0.93 and 0.9.19622
Our theoretical results showed that the correlation between welfare loss and γcn only623
holds conditional on the intermediate input share parameter γv, while in the representative624
economies the correlation holds unconditionally. The result obtained for the estimated pa-625
rameter combinations is the consequence of the correlation across steady state ratios in the626
input-output tables data. Figure 4 shows pair-wise scatter plots of the share of intermedi-627
ate goods in GDP, the share of tradable goods in consumption and the share of tradable628
goods in investment. Countries with a large non-traded share in the consumption basket629
tend to have a large non-traded share also in the investment basket. In addition, a large630
non-traded consumption share in the data is highly correlated with a low share of imported631
intermediates in GDP.632
5. Conclusions633
We study the relationship between openness, the optimal volatility of the exchange rate634
and the welfare cost of an exchange rate peg in a model economy where the same degree635
of openness can be achieved through different compositions of imports across consumption,636
19The measured correlations between the welfare loss from a peg, the investment non-tradable share and
the non-tradable bias in investment γin are even larger than for the non-tradable bias in consumption γcn.
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investment and intermediate goods. Our results show that the optimal volatility of the637
exchange rate depends on the composition of imports, and that aggregate measures of the638
size of trade flows can be close to irrelevant for the ranking of alternative monetary policies.639
We derive analytical results using a simple, multi-good SOE model with one period preset640
prices, where time-varying markups result in inefficiency gaps. The solution to the Ramsey641
problem shows that the optimal trade-off across inefficiency gaps is independent of the share642
of imported inputs in production, and thus not directly related to openness. In turn, a643
larger intermediate imports share is irrelevant for the trade-off, but requires larger optimal644
movements in the exchange rate to prevent relative price misalignments.645
We provide quantitative results using a model extended to include capital and incomplete646
financial markets, where the parameters governing the composition of international trade647
are calibrated using OECD input-output data. Inefficiencies in the import sector pricing648
provide the main incentive for the Ramsey planner to deviate from full stabilization of the649
non-tradables price, but have a small impact on the welfare cost of a peg. Inefficiencies650
in the non-tradable sector pricing and the spill-over of shocks across sectors through labor651
mobility result, under the optimal policy, in substantial volatility of the nominal exchange652
rate. A peg forces instead the adjustment of relative prices after sectoral shocks on the653
sticky non-tradable price. This can result in large welfare losses if the share of imported654
intermediates in the domestic production input mix is high, and at the same time the bias655
towards non-tradable goods is high.656
The relevance of our results is supported by the high variance in the composition of657
demand and international trade flows that we find in the data. We document from the latest658
release of the OECD input-output tables that differences in the composition of imports across659
both industrial and emerging economies are substantial, and provide estimates of the tradable660
and non-tradable input shares in consumption and investment for 25 countries. Using these661
data, we parameterize the consumption, investment and production input baskets for 25662
representative economies to examine how the variability in parameters implied by the data663
affects the welfare loss from a peg. Our results show that welfare losses range between 0.06%664
and 0.23% of steady state consumption. Finally, we find that our estimates of the share of665
non-tradable goods in consumption and investment are good predictors of the welfare cost666
32
from adopting a fixed exchange rate policy, despite the fact that in the model the relationship667
between non-tradable share and welfare loss holds only conditional on the share of imported668
intermediates in the domestic production input mix.669
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Table 1: Non-tradable input shares, demand and import allocation for 25
countries from Input-output tables data.
Country Imp. inv./gdp Imp. cons./gdp Cons./gdp Inv./gdp Interm./gdp N-cons. share N-inv. share export/gdp
aut 0.061 0.096 0.507 0.236 0.283 0.237 0.263 0.469
bel 0.062 0.095 0.505 0.204 0.459 0.166 0.208 0.894
can 0.052 0.066 0.518 0.197 0.251 0.31 0.333 0.479
cze 0.083 0.089 0.478 0.274 0.541 0.227 0.288 0.725
deu 0.031 0.056 0.556 0.195 0.197 0.295 0.287 0.391
dnk 0.041 0.066 0.422 0.19 0.127 0.256 0.261 0.487
esp 0.042 0.067 0.569 0.273 0.216 0.378 0.42 0.244
est 0.11 0.122 0.513 0.305 0.588 0.207 0.144 0.807
fin 0.033 0.049 0.442 0.201 0.276 0.513 0.42 0.463
fra 0.026 0.062 0.53 0.197 0.173 0.378 0.406 0.274
gbr 0.035 0.092 0.626 0.169 0.162 0.311 0.393 0.262
grc 0.046 0.103 0.697 0.222 0.184 0.47 0.49 0.179
ita 0.028 0.051 0.571 0.209 0.18 0.449 0.418 0.257
jpn 0.013 0.028 0.567 0.246 0.08 0.687 0.585 0.131
kor 0.056 0.042 0.587 0.314 0.324 0.345 0.269 0.42
mex 0.031 0.035 0.662 0.198 0.196 0.387 0.412 0.252
nld 0.044 0.067 0.47 0.193 0.313 0.241 0.311 0.744
nzl 0.057 0.064 0.563 0.222 0.181 0.329 0.346 0.339
pol 0.068 0.074 0.61 0.221 0.226 0.253 0.24 0.335
prt 0.053 0.107 0.62 0.256 0.244 0.303 0.399 0.26
svk 0.081 0.12 0.529 0.266 0.586 0.183 0.251 0.764
svn 0.09 0.125 0.51 0.266 0.425 0.359 0.362 0.612
swe 0.05 0.056 0.436 0.172 0.278 0.324 0.207 0.492
tur 0.038 0.043 0.716 0.184 0.17 0.217 0.287 0.204
usa 0.015 0.039 0.686 0.197 0.076 0.701 0.577 0.091
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Table 2: Benchmark parameter values
Description symbol value Description symbol value
Depreciation δ 0.025 Capital share H αH 0.67
Elasticity H-V ρhv 0.5 Capital share N αN 0.33
Discount factor β 0.99 Intertemporal elast. σ 1
Weight on labor ℓ 24.065 Labor elasticity η 0.5
Cons. share H-goods γch 0.74 Inv. share H-goods γih 0.65
Inv. bias N-goods γin 0.2 Cons. bias N-goods γcn 0.13
Elasticity bond premium – 0.01 Share value added H γv 0.54
Share of gov. spending N – 0.4 Elasticity of demand θ −11
Calvo probability H ϑ 0.8 Calvo probability F ϑF 0.8
Cons. dem. elasticity H ρch 2 Inv. dem. elasticity H ρih 2
Cons. dem. elasticity N ρcn 0.7 Inv. dem. elasticity N ρin 0.75
Elasticity Invest. adj. cost – 0.5
Shocks
Autocorrelation aH ρaH 0.95 Autocorrelation a
N ρaN 0.95
Autocorrelation d ρd 0.85 Autocorrelation policy shock ρi 0
Autocorrelation p∗H ρpH 0.75 Autocorrelation p
∗
F ρpF 0.71
Autocorrelation i∗ ρi∗ 0.95 Autocorrelation p
∗
M ρPM 0.85
Std. dev. aH σaH 0.533% Std. dev. a
N σaN 0.533%
Std. dev. p∗H σpH 0.735% Std. dev. d σd 0.9%
Std. dev. i∗ σi∗ 0.05% Std. dev. policy shock σi 0.05%
Std. dev. p∗M σpM 1.39% Std. dev. p
∗
F σpF 2.12%
Policy
Policy smoothing χ 0.8 Policy resp. output ωy 0.4
Policy resp. exchange rat. ωE 0.1 Policy resp. infl. ωπ 2
671
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Table 3: Volatility of non-tradable sector inflation relative to non-tradable output (in
percent) under optimal policy.†
Case Shock
AH,t AN,t Dt P
∗
H,t i
∗
t P
∗
F,t P
∗
M,t
Complete Markets 12.12 13.93 18.60 41.67 0.00 26.42 30.24
Incomplete Markets 11.27 5.88 2.39 18.59 5.57 19.78 17.86
† Note: Each column reports the ratio of the standard deviation of piN,t to the stan-
dard deviation of YN (in log-deviations), in an economy where cyclical volatility is
generated by the single exogenous shock.
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Table 4: Moments for Germany and the Czech Republic used in estimation of trade parameters. Input-output
tables data and values returned by the estimation.
Deu Cze
Ratio Model Data Model Data
Imported inv./ gdp 0.034 0.031 0.083 0.083
Imported cons./ gdp 0.061 0.056 0.089 0.089
Cons./gdp 0.47 0.556 0.489 0.478
Inv./gdp 0.313 0.195 0.314 0.274
export over gdp 0.299 0.391 0.711 0.725
Intermediates/gdp 0.204 0.197 0.539 0.541
Non-tradable consumption share 0.293 0.295 0.221 0.227
Non-tradable investment share 0.385 0.287 0.308 0.288
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Table 5: Estimated non-tradable bias for consumption and
investment goods, and loss from pegging the exchange rate
in percent of steady state consumption.
Country γcn γin Loss
1) bel 0.104 0.144 0.09
[0.097 (1)]
3) est 0.089 0.117 0.093
[0.133 (13)]
2) pol 0.154 0.184 0.093
[0.099 (2)]
4) aut 0.147 0.188 0.097
[0.1 (4)]
5) dnk 0.188 0.218 0.099
[0.1 (3)]
6) tur 0.183 0.216 0.103
[0.105 (5)]
7) svk 0.105 0.165 0.111
[0.121 (8)]
8) swe 0.187 0.208 0.113
[0.117 (6)]
9) deu 0.213 0.242 0.12
[0.12 (7)]
10) kor 0.19 0.213 0.123
[0.127 (10)]
11) nld 0.188 0.229 0.124
[0.124 (9)]
12) nzl 0.232 0.267 0.125
[0.127 (12)]
13) cze 0.126 0.2 0.129
[0.138 (16)]
14) prt 0.23 0.265 0.13
[0.127 (11)]
15) can 0.23 0.265 0.135
[0.136 (15)]
16) gbr 0.286 0.321 0.142
[0.136 (14)]
17) esp 0.272 0.302 0.152
[0.153 (17)]
18) fra 0.307 0.341 0.162
[0.16 (18)]
19) svn 0.221 0.273 0.168
[0.178 (19)]
20) mex 0.325 0.352 0.179
[0.18 (20)]
21) grc 0.363 0.386 0.183
[0.182 (21)]
22) ita 0.344 0.371 0.184
[0.185 (22)]
23) fin 0.375 0.401 0.242
[0.243 (23)]
24) jpn 0.56 0.568 0.259
[0.261 (24)]
25) usa 0.617 0.63 0.283
[0.285 (25)]
Note: In brackets we report the value obtained by adding to the
loss the value (in deviation from the steady-state) of the initial-
period constraint imposed on the optimal timeless policy (see
Benigno and Woodford, 2006), as well as the implied ranking.
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Figure 1: Openness and welfare, contour plots for selected trade parameters (assuming γcn = γin = γN and
γch = γih = γH). Welfare measured as loss from a pegged exchange rate relative to optimal policy, in percent
of steady-state consumption units.
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Figure 2: Estimated bias and elasticity parameters from Input-output tables for 25 countries.
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Figure 3: Welfare loss from exchange rate peg vs. non-tradable share in consumption and non-tradable
consumption bias γcn for 25 representative economies with trade parameter combinations estimated from
Input-output tables. Loss is proportional to the radius of circles’.
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Figure 4: Correlation between tradable share in final demand and intermediate imports for 25 representative
economies with trade parameter combinations derived from Input-output tables.
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Appendix674
Appendix A. SOE with intermediate inputs, LCP and one-period preset prices:675
Derivation of the Ramsey policy676
Summary of equations677
Define678
µt = PtCt
µ∗t = P
∗
t C
∗
t
ΨN,t =
Uc,t
Pt
YN,t
ΨF,t =
Uc,t
Pt
PF,tCF,t
Ps,F,t
.
where Uc,t is the marginal utility of consumption. Let the pre-tax steady-state markups in679
the monopolistically competitive domestic and foreign sectors be equal to µN = µF =
̺
̺−1
.680
The constraints of the policymaker can be summarized by the system of equations:681
PT,t = γ
−γH
H (1− γH)
−(1−γH )
(
StP
∗
H,t
)γH P 1−γHF,t (A.1)
682
µt
κµ∗t
= St (A.2)
683
µN
γN
CN,t
PtCt
=
(
Et−1ΨN,tZ
−1
N,tWt
Et−1ΨN,t
)−1
(A.3)
684
CH,t = (1− γN) γH
(
StP
∗
H,t
PT,t
)−1(
PT,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (A.4)
685
CF,t = (1− γN) (1− γH)
(
PF,t
PT,t
)−1(
PT,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (A.5)
686
Wt = H
η
t PtCt (A.6)
687
PN,t = µN
EtΨN,t+1Z
−1
N,t+1Wt+1
EtΨN,t+1
(A.7)
688
γγFF (1− γF )
(1−γF ) PF,t
(
StP
∗
F,t
)(γF−1) = pγFF,t = (µF Et−1ΨF,tStP ∗F,tEt−1ΨF,t
)γF
, (A.8)
689
StP
∗
H,t = Z
−1
H,t(1− γv)
−(1−γv) (γv)
((1−γv)−1) (Hηt PtCt)
(γv)
(
StP
∗
M,t
)(1−γv)
(A.9)
690
Ht = (γv)StP
∗
H,t
YH,t
Hηt PtCt
+ Z−1N,tCN,t (A.10)
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691
Mt = (1− γv)P
∗
H,t
YH,t
P ∗M,t
(A.11)
YH,t = CH,t + C
∗
H,t (A.12)
Pt = γ
−γn
n (1− γn)
−(1−γn) P γnN,t−1P
1−γn
T,t (A.13)
where eq. (A.8) is obtained using the fact that Ps,F,t = pF,t−1 and Ys,F,t = γF
(
Ps,F,t
PF,t
)−1
CF,t,692
thus the optimal sticky-price chosen by foreign good importers can be written as pF,t =693
µF
Et−1ΨF,tStP
∗
F,t
Et−1ΨF,t
. Eqs. (A.10) and (A.11) give the conditional factor demands in the trad-694
able sector. The variable C∗H,t is net exports of the tradable good H.695
Reduction of the non-linear model696
Combining the equilibrium conditions, eq. (A.9) can berewritten as697
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t = Z
−1
H,t(1− γv)
−(1−γv) (γv)
((1−γv)−1) (Hηt µt)
(1−(1−γv))
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗M,t
)(1−γv)
(A.14)
Simplifying the µt terms, obtain698
1
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t = Z
−1
H,t(1− γv)
−(1−γv) (γv)
((1−γv)−1) (Hηt )
(1−(1−γv))
(
1
κµ∗t
P ∗M,t
)(1−γv)
. (A.15)
Eq. (A.15) shows that total labor hours Ht do not depend on policy. This is the consequence699
of assuming log-utility, Cobb-Douglas aggregators in consumption and production, complete700
markets and perfect competition in the tradable sector against foreign producers of the good701
H.702
Using the result from the FOC of the household that703
ΨN,t =
CN,t
PtCt
=
γN
PN,t
(A.16)
ΨF,t = γF
PF,tCF,t
PtCt
1
Ps,F,t
= γF (1− γN)(1− γh)
1
Ps,F,t
(A.17)
and the fact that Ps,F,t = pF,t−1, PN,t = pN,t−1 we obtain that the ΨN,t+1 terms in the non-704
tradable sector pricing equation are known at time t, and they cancel out. Similarly, the ΨF,t705
terms in the import sector pricing equation cancel out. The equilibrium can be described by706
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the four equations:707
µNEt−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt =
[
1
γN
CN,t
µt
]−1
(A.18)
708
γγFF (1− γF )
(1−γF ) PF,t
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)(γF−1)
=
(
µFEt−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF
(A.19)
709
1
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t = Z
−1
H,t(1− γv)
−(1−γv) (γv)
((1−γv)−1) (Hηt )
(γv)
(
1
κµ∗t
P ∗M,t
)(1−γv)
(A.20)
710
Pt = γ
−γn
n (1− γn)
−(1−γn)
(
Et−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt
)γn (
γ−γHH (1− γH)
−(1−γH )
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t
)γH
P 1−γHF,t
)1−γn
(A.21)
Equation (A.18) defines the relationship between the optimal predetermined price pN,t−1 =711
µNEt−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt in the N sector and demand for the N good. Equation (A.19) defines a712
relationship between nominal income (µt ≡ PtCt) and the price of imported foreign goods713
(PF,t), using the optimal predetermined price pF,t−1 = µFEt−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t among the sticky-price714
importers . Equation (A.21) defines a relationship between the price level (Pt) and nominal715
income.716
Ramsey problem717
Following Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Corsetti (2006) we can assume policy sets µt,718
or, through the financial asset equilibrium condition, the nominal exchange rate St.719
To specify the Ramsey problem as in the main text, we use the result that in equilibrium720
Ht is independent of policy. Therefore, the constraints for the Ramsey problem can be721
summarized using only the CPI aggregator and the pricing optimality conditions from the722
competitive equilibrium, which can be written in terms of µt, St, Ht and exogenous shocks.723
The financial asset equilibrium condition implies St =
µt
κµ∗t
. Therefore, similarly to Woodford724
(2003, p. 570) and Ada˜o et al. (2003), we can rewrite Pt, PF,t as725
Pt = κN
(
Et−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt
)γn
×(
κH
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t
)γH
P 1−γHF,t
)1−γn
(A.22)
and726
PF,t = κF
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)(1−γF )(
Et−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF
where κN = γ
−γn
n (1− γn)
−(1−γn), κH = γ
−γH
H (1− γH)
−(1−γH ), and κF = µFγ
−γF
F (1− γF )
−(1−γF ).727
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Now define728
ΩP,t ≡ Pt
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t
)(γn−1)γH ( µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)(γF−1)(1−γH )(1−γn)
= κN
(
Et−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt
)γn (
κH
(
κF
(
Et−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF)1−γH)1−γn
so that ΩP,t is predetermined at time t.729
After defining730
Θt ≡
(
κH
(
κF
(
Et−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF)1−γH)1−γn
which is predetermined at time t, the policymaker objective function can be rewritten as731
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [log (µt)− log (ΩP,t) + log (µt) ((γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn)) + t.i.p.]
where the term independent of policy also includes a term equal to732
log
((
1
κµ∗t
P ∗H,t
)(γn−1)γH ( 1
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)(γF−1)(1−γH )(1−γn))
.
Appropriately rewriting the constraints in terms of the variables ΩP,t,Θt, we obtain the733
Lagrangian for the Ramsey problem:734
max
µt,Ωt,Θt
E0
∞∑
i=0
βi [(1 + (γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn)) log (µt+j)− log (ΩP,t+j) -t.i.p. +
+E−1λt−1
[(
ΩP,t+j
κNΘt+j
) 1
γn
− Z−1N,t+jH
η
t+jµt+j
]
+ E−1ϕt−1
( Θt+j
κ
(1−γn)
H κ
(1−γH )(1−γn)
F
) 1
γF (1−γH )(1−γn)
−
µt+j
κµ∗t+j
P ∗F,t+j

where λt and ϕt are Lagrange multipliers. The FOCs for teh problem are:735
ΩP,t : −Ω
−1
P,t +
1
γn
λt−1 (κNΘt)
− 1
γn Ω
1
γn
−1
P,t = 0
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736
Θt : 0 = −λt−1
1
γn
(
ΩP,t
κN
) 1
γn
Θ
1
γn
−1
t (A.23)
+ϕt−1
1
γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(A.24)(
1
κ
(1−γn)
H κ
(1−γH )(1−γn)
F
) 1
γF (1−γH )(1−γn)
Θ
1
γF (1−γH )(1−γn)
−1
t (A.25)
737
µt : (1 + (γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn))µ
−1
t − λt−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t − ϕt−1
1
κµ∗t+j
P ∗F,t+j = 0
Rearranging we get738
λt−1 = γn (κNΘt)
1
γn Ω
− 1
γn
P,t
which we replace in the second FOC to obtain739
ϕt−1 = γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(
κ
(1−γn)
H κ
(1−γH )(1−γn)
F
) 1
γF (1−γH )(1−γn) Θ
1
γF (1−γH )(γn−1)
t = 0
Replacing ϕt−1and λt−1 in the FOC for µt gives740
0 = (1 + (γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn))µ
−1
t +
−γnκ
1
γn
N Θ
1
γn
t Ω
− 1
γn
P,t Z
−1
N,tH
η
t +
−γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(
κ
(1−γn)
H κ
(1−γH )(1−γn)
F
) 1
γF (1−γH )(1−γn) Θ
1
γF (1−γH )(γn−1)
t
1
κµ∗t+j
P ∗F,t+j(A.26)
Recall that741
Θt = κ
(1−γn)
H κ
(1−γH )(1−γn)
F
(
Et−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF (1−γH )(1−γn)
and742
ΩP,t = κN
(
Et−1Z
−1
N,tH
η
t µt
)γn
κ
(1−γn)
H κ
(1−γH )(1−γn)
F
(
Et−1
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
)γF (1−γH )(1−γn)
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Replacing these into equation (A.26) obtain:743
0 = (1 + (γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn)) +
−γn
Z−1N,tH
η
t µt
Et−1
(
Z−1t H
η
t µt
) +
−γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
Et−1
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
) (A.27)
Note that744
Z−1N,tH
η
t µt
Et−1
(
Z−1t H
η
t µt
) ≡ MCN,t
PN,t
≡ ξN,t
and745
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
Et−1
(
µt
κµ∗t
P ∗F,t
) = MCF,t
pf,t
≡ ξF,t
where ξN,t and ξF,t are the inverse stochastic mark-ups. Note that we assume firms are746
subsidized through lump-sum taxes levied on households, so that the flexible-price mark-up747
is equal to µi(1− τµi) = 1 for i = {N,F}. In the absence of the subsidy, ξi,t =
MCnomi,t
Pi,t
µi.748
The first best would be achieved by setting ξN,t = ξF,t = 1.
20 Eq. (A.27) shows that749
complete markup (price) stabilization in either of the two sectors is not optimal. Similarly,750
complete stabilization of the exchange rate St is optimal only under very specific assumptions.751
For example, with nominal exchange rate stability and constant import prices of F goods752
we have753
(1 + (γn − 1) γH − 1 (1− γH) (1− γn)) = γn
Z−1N,tH
η
t µ
∗
t
Et−1
(
Z−1t H
η
t µ
∗
t
)
which is satisfied only for γn = 0, or if non-traded goods prices are flexible (as in Duarte and754
Obstfeld, 2008).755
20Note that in the steady state we have
(1 + (γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn))− γn − γF (1− γH) (1− γn) = 0
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Second order approximation756
The FOC (A.27) can be written as the sum of two terms, each involving the nominal757
exchange rate St.The first term depends on H
η
t µt, which in turn using equation (A.20) can758
be rewritten as a function of exogenous variables and the term
µt
κµ∗t
= St. The second term759
depends explicitely on
µt
κµ∗t
= St. Thus the FOC for the Ramsey problem implicitely defines760
an optimal targeting rule for the nominal exchange rate St of the form761
1 = Γ
StXt
Et−1StXt
+ (1− Γ)
StYt
Et−1StYt
Define the log-difference of the variable Xt as X˜t = log(Xt) − log(XSS) where XSS is the762
steady state value of Xt.Then, following Lombardo and Sutherland (2007), a second order763
approximation gives764
Γ
[
S˜IIt + X˜
II
t +
1
2
(
S˜It + X˜
I
t
)2
−Et−1
(
S˜IIt + X˜
II
t +
1
2
(
S˜It + X˜
I
t
)2)]
+
(1− Γ)
[
S˜IIt + Y˜
II
t +
1
2
(
S˜It + Y˜
I
t
)2
−Et−1
(
S˜IIt + Y˜
II
t +
1
2
(
S˜It + Y˜
I
t
)2)]
= 0
The first order approximation yields an explicit function for St765
S˜It = −ΓX˜
I
t − (1− Γ) Y˜
I
t + ΓEt−1X˜
I
t + (1− Γ)Et−1Y˜
I
t
This approximation shows that the nominal exchange rate St follows an iid process. By the766
same logic, St must be iid at any order of approximation. Then, the second order solution767
must be768
S˜IIt = −Γ
[
X˜IIt +
1
2
(
S˜It + X˜
I
t
)2
− Et−1
(
X˜IIt +
1
2
(
S˜It + X˜
I
t
)2)]
+
− (1− Γ)
[
Y˜ IIt +
1
2
(
S˜It + Y˜
I
t
)2
− Et−1
(
Y˜ IIt +
1
2
(
S˜It + Y˜
I
t
)2)]
Rewriting eq. (A.27) as769
1 = (1− Γ)
Z−1N,t
(
P ∗H,tZH,t
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)) 1(γv)
St
Et−1
(
Z−1N,t
(
ZH,t
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)) 1(γv)
St
)+ Γ StP ∗F,t
Et−1
(
StP
∗
F,t
)
49
define770
Xt = Z
−1
N,t
(
P ∗H,tZH,t
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)) 1(γv)
771
Yt = P
∗
F,t
772
Γ =
γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(γn + γF (1− γH) (1− γn))
Using the first order expansion of Xt :773
X˜t = −Z˜N,t +
1
γv
(
P˜ ∗H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv)P˜
∗
M,t
)
obtain using the results for S˜It , S˜
II
t that the first order solution for St is774
S˜It = − (1− Γ)
(
−εN,t +
1
γv
(
ε∗H,t + εH,t − (1− γv)ε
∗
M,t
))
− Γε∗F,t
and the second order solution is775
S˜IIt = − (1− Γ)
(
−εN,t +
1
γv
(
ε∗H,t + εH,t − (1− γv)ε
∗
M,t
))
− Γε∗F,t
−
(1− Γ)Γ
2
[
X˜2t + Y˜
2
t − 2X˜tY˜t − Et−1
(
X˜2t + Y˜
2
t − 2X˜tY˜t
)]
To obtain the welfare loss from pegging the exchange rate relative to the optimal policy,776
we evaluate the welfare under the two policies using a second-order approximation of the777
constraint ΩP,t. Recall that welfare is given by778
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [(1 + (γn − 1) γH + (γF − 1) (1− γH) (1− γn)) log (µt)− log (ΩP,t) + t.i.p. (A.28)
Taking a second order approximation of the equation defining ΩP,t obtain:779
Ω˜P,t +
1
2
Ω˜2P,t = Et−1γn
[
−Z˜N,t + ηH˜t + µ˜t +
1
2
(
−Z˜N,t + ηH˜t + µ˜t
)2]
+ γF (1− γH) (1− γn)Et−1
[
µ˜t − µ˜
∗
t + P˜
∗
F,t +
1
2
(
µ˜t − µ˜
∗
t + P˜
∗
F,t
)2]
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so that780
Ω˜P,t = Et−1γn
[
µ˜t +
1
2
(
−Z˜N,t + ηH˜t + µ˜t
)2]
+ γF (1− γH) (1− γn)Et−1
[
µ˜t +
1
2
(
µ˜t − µ˜
∗
t + P˜
∗
F,t
)2]
+
−
1
2
[
Et−1
[
γn
(
−Z˜N,t + ηH˜t + µ˜t
)
+ γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(
µ˜t − µ˜
∗
t + P˜
∗
F,t
)]]2
+ t.i.p.
Recall that781
Ht =
(
(1− γv)
(1−γv) (γv)
(γv) (κµ∗t )
(1−γv)−1 P ∗H,tZH,t
(
P ∗M,t
)−(1−γv)) 1η(γv)
or782
ηH˜t =
1
(γv)
(
− (γv) µ˜
∗
t + P˜
∗
H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv)P˜
∗
M,t
)
where the approximation involves only first order terms sinceHt is a convolution of exogenous783
AR(1) shocks. Replacing Ht in Ω˜P,t and using µt = Stµ
∗
t we obtain:784
Ω˜P,t = Et−1 (γn + γF (1− γH) (1− γn)) S˜t (A.29)
Et−1γn
[
µ˜∗t +
1
2
(
−Z˜N,t +
1
(γv)
(
P˜ ∗H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv)P˜
∗
M,t
)
+ S˜t
)2]
+ γF (1− γH) (1− γn)Et−1
[
µ˜∗t +
1
2
(
S˜t + P˜
∗
F,t
)2]
+
−
1
2
[
Et−1
[
γn
(
−Z˜N,t +
1
(γv)
(
P˜ ∗H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv)P˜
∗
M,t
)
+ S˜t
)
+γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(
S˜t + P˜
∗
F,t
)]]2
+ t.i.p.
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Using the result that Et−1S˜t = 0 and replacing the first order solution for S˜t under the785
optimal policy gives:786
Et−1Ω˜
optimal
P,t = Et−1γn
µ˜∗t + 12
 −Z˜N,t + 1γv
(
P˜ ∗H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv) P˜
∗
M,t
)
−
(1− Γ)
(
−εN,t +
1
γv
(
ε∗H,t + εH,t − (1− γv) ε
∗
M,t
))
− Γε∗F,t

2

+ γF (1− γH) (1− γn)×
Et−1
µ˜∗t + 12
 − (1− Γ)
(
−εN,t +
1
γv
(
ε∗H,t + εH,t − (1− γv) ε
∗
M,t
))
−Γε∗F,t + P˜
∗
F,t

2+
−
1
2
[
Et−1
[
γn
(
−Z˜N,t +
1
γv
(
P˜ ∗H,t + Z˜H,t − (1− γv) P˜
∗
M,t
))
+ γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
(
P˜ ∗F,t
)]]
+ t.i.p.
Under the assumption that shocks are not cross correlated, we have:787
2E0Ω˜
optimal
P,t = γn
((
(1− γn)
1
1− ρ2
)
− (1− Γ)
)
σ˜2N (A.30)
γn
(
(1− γn)
1
1− ρ2
+− (1− Γ)
)
1
(γv)
2
[
σ˜2∗H + σ˜
2
H + (1− γv)
2σ˜∗2M
]
+
{
γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
[
(1− γF (1− γH) (1− γn))
1
1− ρ2
− Γ
]}
σ˜∗2F +
t.i.p
where, WLOG, we assume that all shocks have identical AR(1) coefficient, denoted by788
ρ. Using eq. (A.29) under the peg (S˜t = 0) we have instead:
21
789
2E0Ω˜
peg
P,t = γn
(
(1− γn)
1
1− ρ2
)
σ˜2N (A.31)
γn (1− γn)
1
1− ρ2
1
(γv)
2
[
σ˜2∗H + σ˜
2
H + (1− γv)
2σ˜∗2M
]
+
{
γF (1− γH) (1− γn)
[
(1− γF (1− γH) (1− γn))
1
1− ρ2
]}
σ˜∗2F +
t.i.p
21To see this, note that all terms in 2E0Ω˜P,t+j not multiplied by
1
1− ρ2
relate to the exchange rate, and
hence disappear under the peg. The term multiplied by 2 also disappears as it relates to the cross product
involving the exchange rate.
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Finally, adding and subtracting log(µ˜∗t ) = log(µt) − log(St) from eq.(A.28) we obtain that790
welfare can be expressed as the sum of terms independent of policy and a linear function791
of the term E0Ω˜P,t. Evaluating welfare using eqs. (A.30) and (A.31), the welfare difference792
between the optimal policy and peg is then793
Woptimal0 −W
peg
0 =
1
2
γn (1− Γ) σ˜
2
N +
γn (1− Γ)
1
(γv)
2
[
σ˜2∗H + σ˜
2
H + (1− γv)
2σ˜∗2M
]
+ (A.32)
+γF (1− γH) (1− γn) Γσ
∗2
F
Appendix B. Parameterized Model with Capital and Staggered Price Adjust-794
ment. Equilibrium conditions795
Appendix B.1. First Order Conditions796
Define the investment aggregates:797
IJt =
[
(γin)
1
ρin
(
IJN,t
) ρin−1
ρin + (1− γin)
1
ρin
(
IJT,t
) ρin−1
ρin
] ρin
ρin−1
, J = N,H (B.1)
798
IJT,t =
[
(γih)
1
ρih
(
IJH,t
) ρih−1
ρih + (1− γih)
1
ρih
(
IJF,t
) ρih−1
ρih
] ρih
ρih−1
, J = N,H (B.2)
799
IJN,t =
[∫ 1
0
(
IJN,t
) ̺−1
̺ (z)dz
] ̺
̺−1
(B.3)
where the superscript J refers to the sector.800
Households’ demand functions imply that the composite good price indices can be written801
as:802
P ct =
[
(γcn) (PN,t)
1−ρcn + (1− γcn)
(
P cT,t
)1−ρcn] 11−ρcn
(B.4)
803
P cT,t =
[
(γch) (PH,t)
1−ρch + (1− γch) (PF,t)
1−ρch
] 1
1−ρch (B.5)
804
PN,t =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−̺N,t (z)dz
] 1
1−̺
(B.6)
where P ct , P
c
T,t, and PN,t are the consumer price index (CPI), the price index for T con-805
sumption goods, and the price index for N consumption goods, respectively. Investment806
price indices (P it , P
i
T,t, and PN,t) can be similarly obtained.807
53
The household is assumed to maximize the inter-temporal utility function (29) subject808
to (26), (27), (28), (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), (30), and the laws of motion for capital in each sector.809
The solution to the household decision problem gives the following first order conditions810
(FOCs):811
λCt = βEt
{
λCt+1 (1 + it)
P ct
P ct+1
}
(B.7)
812
Et
{
λCt+1
P ct
P ct+1
[
(1 + it)− (1 + i
∗
t )
St+1
St
]}
= 0 (B.8)
λCt
P it
P ct
QJt = βEt{λ
C
t+1
(
PJ,t+1
P ct+1
RJt+1
)
+ λCt+1
P it+1
P ct+1
QJt+1[Φ
(
IJt+1
KJt
)
(B.9)
−
IJt+1
KJt
Φ′
(
IJt+1
KJt
)
+ (1− δ)]}, J=N,H
813
QJt =
[
Φ′
(
IJt
KJt−1
)]−1
J = N,H (B.10)
814
CN,t =
γcn
1− γcn
(
P cT,t
PN,t
)ρcn
CT,t ; CH,t =
γch
1− γch
(
PF,t
PH,t
)ρch
CF,t (B.11)
815
IJN,t =
γin
1− γin
(
P iT,t
PN,t
)ρin
IJT,t ; I
J
H,t =
γih
1− γih
(
PF,t
PH,t
)ρih
IJF,t, J = N,H (B.12)
816
λCt
WNt
P ct
= ℓ (Ht)
ηH ; λCt
WHt
P ct
= ℓ (Ht)
ηH (B.13)
where λCt =
1
Ct
is the marginal utility of total consumption and (1 + it) =
1
vt
. Eqs. (B.7) to817
(B.10) are the Euler equations for the assets available to households, where QJt is Tobin’s Q.818
The conditions in (B.11) and (B.12) give the optimal choice for consumption and investment819
across goods. The labor supply optimality conditions in (B.13) imply that
WNt
P ct
=
WHt
P ct
, a820
consequence of costless labor mobility across sectors.821
Cost minimization in the non-tradable sector implies:822
WNt
PN,t
=MCNt (z) [1− αn] (γnv)
1
ρnv
VN,t(z)
HNt (z)
(
YN,t(z)
VN,t(z)
) 1
ρnv
(B.14)
823
RNt = MC
N
t (z)αN (γnv)
1
ρnv
VN,t(z)
KNt−1(z)
(
YN,t(z)
VN,t(z)
) 1
ρnv
(B.15)
PM,t
PN,t
= MCNt (z) (1− γnv)
1
ρnv
(
YN,t
MN,t
) 1
ρnv
(B.16)
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where MCNt (z) is the real marginal cost for firm z and PM,t is the domestic currency price824
of the imported intermediate good.825
Cost minimization in the tradable sector gives the factor demands:826
WHt
PH,t
= (1− αh) (γv)
1
ρv
VH,t
HHt
(
YH,t
VH,t
) 1
ρv
(B.17)
827
RHt = αh (γv)
1
ρv
VH,t
KHt−1
(
YH,t
VH,t
) 1
ρv
(B.18)
828
PM,t
PH,t
= (1− γv)
1
ρv
(
YH,t
MH,t
) 1
ρv
(B.19)
Appendix B.2. Market Clearing829
We assume government purchases a fixed amount GN,t of N goods. The resource con-830
straint in the nontradable and domestic tradable sector is given by831
YN,t = (CN,t + I
N
N,t + I
H
N,t +GN,t)
∫ 1
0
[
PN,t(z)
PN,t
]−̺
dz (B.20)
832
YH,t = ABH,t + C
∗
H,t (B.21)
833
ABH,t = CH,t + I
N
H,t + I
H
H,t (B.22)
where ABH,t is domestic absorption and C
∗
H,t are net exports of the H good.834
The trade balance, expressed in units of good H , can be written as835
NXH,t = C
∗
H,t −
PF,t
PH,t
XF,t −
PM,t
PH,t
(MH,t +MN,t) (B.23)
where XF,t =
∫ 1
0
YF,t(z)dz = YF,t. With complete pass-through, it holds: YF,t = XF,t =836
(CF,t+ I
N
F,t+ I
H
F,t). Assuming that domestic bonds are in zero net supply, the current account837
(in nominal terms) reads as838
StB
∗
t =
(
1 + i∗t−1
)
StB
∗
t−1 + PH,tNXH,t (B.24)
Finally, labor market clearing requires839
Hdt = H
N
t +H
H
t = H
s
t (B.25)
Using the aggregate consumption good as numeraire, we obtain the total value added in the840
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economy as:841
GDP ct =
PN,tYN,t + PH,tYH,t
P ct
− (MH,t +MN,t)SM,t
PH
P ct
(B.26)
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), the nominal interest rate at which households842
can borrow internationally is given by the exogenous world interest rate ı˜∗ plus a premium,843
which is assumed to be increasing in the real value of the country’s stock of foreign debt:844
(1 + i∗t ) = (1 + ı˜
∗
t )g(−BH,t) (B.27)
where BH,t =
StB
∗
t
PH,t
and g(·) is a positive, increasing function. Eq. (B.27) ensures the845
stationarity of the model.846
Appendix C. Parameterized Model with Capital and Staggered Price Adjust-847
ment. Baseline parameterization848
We assume the values for γch, γih, γv, γcn, γin, ρcn, and ρin are equal to the esti-849
mates obtained from input-output tables data for the Czech Republic. Table 2 reports these850
benchmark values. The remaining parameters are in line with the international business851
cycle literature and with macroeconomic evidence for OECD countries. The elasticity of852
substitution ρv between the imported intermediate good XH,t and domestic value added853
VH,t is set equal to 0.5 . We assume that the foreign and domestic goods in the tradable854
consumption and investment index are closer substitutes, and set ρih, ρch equal to 2. The855
quarterly discount factor β is set equal to 0.99, which implies a steady-state real world856
interest rate of 4 percent in a steady state with zero inflation. The elasticity of labor supply857
is set equal to 1
2
, and the ratio of average hours worked relative to total hours equal to 1
3
. We858
assume 40 percent of domestic nontradable output is absorbed by the government sector in859
steady state, while no tradable goods is purchased by the government. This (approximately)860
consistent with OECD input-output data. The elasticity of Tobin’s Q with respect to the861
investment-capital ratio is set equal to 0.5 . We assume there are no capital adjustment862
costs in steady state. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital, δ, is assigned the value863
of 0.025. Following Cook and Devereux (2006) the tradable sector is assumed to be more864
capital-intensive than the nontradable sector, with αh = 0.67 and αn = 0.33. The speed of865
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price-adjustment in the nontradable sector is assumed to be slower than in the US, and on866
the upper end of estimates for European countries reported by Gal´ı et al. (2001). The uncon-867
ditional probability (1−ϑ) of adjusting prices in any period is set equal to 0.2. With larger868
values, CPI inflation would be too volatile, given the estimate for the shares of nontradable869
consumption and investment goods. The steady-state mark-up in the nontradable sector is870
set equal to 10 percent, consistent with macroeconomic evidence for OECD countries. The871
markup and the price-adjustment speed in the consumption good import sector are assumed872
identical to the non-traded good sector.873
The monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate according to the rule:874
(1 + it) =
[(
1 + πt
1 + πss
)ωπ ( et
ess
)ωe ( Yt
Yss
)ωY ](1−χ)
[(1 + it−1)]
χ εi,t (C.1)
where ωπ , ωe, ωY ≥ 0 are the feedback coefficients to CPI inflation, nominal exchange875
rate, and GDP in units of domestic consumption aggregate (Yt ), χ ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of876
smoothing and εi,t is an exogenous shock to monetary policy. The subscript ss indicates877
the steady-state value of a variable. We set ωπ = 1, ωY = 0.4, ωe = 0.1, χ = 0.8.878
The parameterization of the exogenous stochastic processes ensures that he business
cycle properties of the model economy are consistent with data on small open emerging
market economies. The resulting values are in line with the recent literature on micro-
founded open-economy model with nominal rigidities (Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005, Kollmann,
2002, Kollmann, 1997, Laxton and Pesenti, 2003, Monacelli, 2005).The exogenous stochastic
processes for the total factor productivity shock in the tradable and nontradable good sector,
the household preference shifter, the foreign-currency price of the tradable goods H and
F and the imported intermediate input, and the foreign interest rate follow an AR(1)
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specification in logs:
aHt = ρaHa
H
t−1 + εaH ,t
aNt = ρaNa
N
t−1 + εaN ,t
dt = ρddt−1 + εd,t
p∗H,t = ρpHp
∗
H,t−1 + εpH ,t
p∗F,t = ρpF p
∗
F,t−1 + εpF ,t
p∗M,t = ρpMp
∗
M,t−1 + εpM ,t
i∗t = ρi∗i
∗
t−1 + εi∗,t
where εj,t is normally distributed with variance σ
2
εj
. The productivity shock innovation879
volatility is set in both sectors equal to σa = 0.008 with ρa = 0.95. These values are in line880
with the international business cycle literature, and close to the ones in Gali and Monacelli881
(2005) and to the average estimate in Kollman (2002) for UK, Japan, Germany over the882
1973-1994 sample. The coefficients for the unobservable preference shock process dt are left883
as free parameters, and are adjusted to ensure sufficient volatility in domestic output. We884
set ρd = 0.85 and σd = 0.009. These values are larger than those in Laxton and Pesenti885
(2003) (ρd = 0.7 and σd = 0.004 ) and similar to the values reported by Monacelli (2005).886
To parameterize the process for the foreign interest rate we use Eurostat data on the average887
money market rate in the EU-15, resulting in estimates of ρi∗ = 0.95 and σi∗ = 0.001.888
The exogenous innovation εi,t in the monetary policy rule follows an i.i.d. process, and its889
standard deviation is set at σi = 0.001 .890
To parameterize the stochastic process for the foreign prices we use data for the Czech891
Republic over the period 1994-2002. The time series for p∗j , j = F,M, is obtained from892
detrended import commodity price indices converted in units of foreign currency (euro)893
using the nominal effective exchange rate . The weights for the foreign intermediate and894
consumption goods’ price indices are the 1997-2006 average Commodity Composition of895
Imports as reported by IMF (2002), the Czech Statistical Office, and the Czech National896
Bank (July 2006 data). p∗H is obtained from the aggregate export price index converted in897
units of foreign currency using the nominal effective exchange rate.898
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Under the baseline parameterization the volatility of output in percentage terms is 2.64899
. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) find an average GDP volatility for Argentina, Brazil, Korea,900
Mexico, and the Philippines equal to 2.79 percent over the period 1994-2001. Among901
the eight Central and Eastern European new EU members, GDP volatility ranged from 0.72902
percent (Hungary) to 2.83 percent (Lithuania) in the 1998-2002 period (Darvas and Szapary,903
2004).904
The standard deviation of consumption and net exports is equal to 2.9 and 1.8 (respec-905
tively 3.63 and 2.40 across five emerging markets economies, Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).906
The policy rule implies a large volatility for the nominal exchange rate, equal to 8 percent907
(Kollmann, 1997 reports an average value of 9.13 percent for Japan, UK, and Germany over908
the 1973-1994 period).909
The volatility of inflation for the composite of tradable goods is 0.68, more than twice910
as large as the volatility of the nontradable good inflation (0.31 ), owing to the larger share911
of flexible prices in the tradable good sector. The volatility for CPI inflation is equal to912
0.55.913
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